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When the government seeks to regulate speech based on its
content, it generally assumes that listeners will process the speech in
a manner that produces social harm. Because the chain of causation
for such speech-based harm runs through the filter of an audience,
courts must constantly make judgments regarding the audience’s
reception of such speech. How will the speech be interpreted by the
audience? To what extent will the speech cause the audience either to
suffer direct emotional harm or to react physically to the speech in a
harmful manner? Although this sort of inquiry—which I refer to as
“audience analysis”—is integral in resolving a broad range of First
Amendment issues, there has been little, if any, holistic examination
of its general position and role within First Amendment jurispru-
dence.
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In this Article, I first seek to introduce a degree of theoretical and
doctrinal clarity to this aspect of speech causation. After tracing the
primary causal paths by which speech may give rise to social harm
on account of its content, I observe that each of these paths requires
courts to make judgments regarding the audience’s comprehension
of, or sensitivity to, the speech in question. I then outline how such
analysis currently fits within First Amendment doctrine. Depending
on the case, audience analysis can take place either at the front end,
in the process of categorizing “borderline” speech, or at the back end,
in the application of more generalized scrutiny analysis. These sorts
of analyses often look very different from each other, and I delineate
the different ways in which courts have approached them.
I then propose that audience analysis should generally be
governed by a simple principle: courts should seek to determine, as
accurately as possible, the extent to which the targeted audience
would foreseeably process the regulated speech in a manner that
produces social harm. In other words, courts should strive to conduct
audience analysis based on a predictive view of how the targeted
audience will likely process the speech, rather than on a strong
normative view of how an idealized “rational audience” should
process the speech. I argue that this basic principle should shape the
tests that courts adopt to define low-value speech, promote greater
solicitude for analyzing empirical data in scrutiny-stage audience
analyses, and ultimately produce a more transparent jurisprudence
that will provide courts with a clearer picture of the actual costs of
speech in a wide range of circumstances.
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INTRODUCTION
First Amendment doctrine is built on the fundamental premise
that unfettered speech is valuable, either because it leads to certain
social benefits or because it is an integral aspect of human auton-
omy and self-realization.1 But free speech, of course, also comes at
a cost. Speech is capable of inflicting significant harm upon others:
it can drive people to act in socially destructive ways, destroy
reputations, or bring about serious emotional damage.2 The First
Amendment has practical meaning only insofar as we are willing to
absorb—to a greater extent than we would with nonspeech—these
social harms in return for the value associated with uninhibited
speech.3 As a result, much of First Amendment jurisprudence is, at
its root, a balancing analysis that requires courts to weigh the value
of speech against the resultant harms.4
As modern First Amendment doctrine has developed over the
past century, courts analyzing content-based speech restrictions
have focused most of their attention on the value side of the ledger.
The all-encompassing term “speech” in the constitutional text has
by now been subdivided into a multitude of categories and sub-
categories, each corresponding to a different level of First Amend-
ment value and protection. Courts have paid comparatively little
attention, however, to the harm side of things.5 In particular, courts’
1. See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
2. See Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1106 (1979)
(observing that speech can “offend, injure reputation, fan prejudice or passion, and ignite the
world”).
3. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 8 (1982)
(“When there is a Free Speech Principle, a limitation of speech requires a stronger
justification, or establishes a higher threshold, for limitations of speech than for limitations
of other forms of conduct. This is so even if the consequences of the speech are as great as the
consequences of other forms of conduct.”). 
4. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 792-93 (2d ed. 1988)
(“[D]eterminations of the reach of first amendment protections ... presuppose some form of
‘balancing’ whether or not they appear to do so. The question is whether the ‘balance’ should
be struck for all cases in the process of framing particular categorical definitions, or whether
the ‘balance’ should be calibrated anew on a case-by-case basis.”); Martin H. Redish, The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 624 (1982) (“[A]ny general rule of first
amendment interpretation that chooses not to afford absolute protection to speech because
of competing social concerns is, in reality, a form of balancing.”).
5. See Frederick Schauer, Is It Better to Be Safe than Sorry?: Free Speech and the
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approaches to issues of speech causation—the processes by which
speech translates into potentially regulable social harms—have
remained relatively undeveloped and inconsistent.
When the government seeks to regulate speech based on its
content, speech causation is inextricably tied to judgments courts
must make regarding the audience of speech. Content-based
restrictions are generally premised on the assumption that the
audience will somehow translate the speech into social harm; it
might, for example, be persuaded to do something harmful as a
result of the speech, or it might suffer direct psychological harm as
a result of the speech.6 In other words, the chain of causation
linking the speech the government seeks to regulate to the social
harm must flow through an intermediary in the form of an audience
because the extent to which the speech causes harm depends on how
the audience processes the speech. Courts’ determinations of how an
audience might process speech—which I refer to as “audience
analysis”—play a significant role across a wide range of First
Amendment issues, but there has been little holistic analysis of the
general characteristics and mechanics of such analysis.7
This Article has two primary aims. First, I seek to introduce a
degree of clarity to this aspect of speech causation by highlighting
the theoretical significance of audience analysis and detailing how
such analysis fits within the doctrinal architecture of the First
Amendment. Second, I propose that audience analysis should
generally be governed by a simple principle: courts should seek to
determine, as accurately as possible, the extent to which the
Precautionary Principle, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 301, 302, 304-05 (2009).
6. See Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 97-
104.
7. Significant scholarly debate regarding speech-based harms and the ways in which
audiences process speech has arisen in the context of particular subsets of speech regulation,
most notably pornography and hate speech. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography,
Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1985) (discussing the ways in
which audiences process pornography in a manner that produces social harm); Mari J.
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2320, 2335-41 (1989) (discussing the harms resulting from hate speech). Such discussions
have tended to focus on the constitutional salience of specific harms and the particular means
by which the state may legitimately regulate those harms. None of the discussions, to my
knowledge, has isolated audience analysis in the abstract and explored, on a holistic level, the
mechanics and governing principles of such analyses as applied throughout First Amendment
jurisprudence.
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regulated speech would foreseeably be processed by the targeted
audience in a manner that produces social harm. In other words,
courts should generally strive to make judgments regarding the
audience’s comprehension of, and sensitivity to, speech based on a
predictive view of how the targeted audience will likely process the
speech, rather than on a strong normative view of how an idealized
“rational audience” should process the speech. I argue that this
basic principle should shape the tests that courts adopt to define
low-value speech, promote greater solicitude for analyzing empirical
and social science data in scrutiny-stage audience analyses, and
ultimately produce a more transparent jurisprudence that will
provide courts with a clearer picture of the actual costs of speech
across a wide range of circumstances.
In Part I, I discuss the theoretical significance of audience
analysis in evaluating content-based restrictions on speech. First,
picking up on recent work from Professor Frederick Schauer,8 I
outline the major causal paths by which speech may give rise to
harm on account of its content. All of these causal paths, by nature,
require courts to make basic judgments regarding the audience of
the speech in question. These audience judgments can be boiled
down to two basic categories: comprehension judgments and
sensitivity judgments. As I demonstrate, at least one of these
judgments must be made for a court to evaluate the content-based
harm resulting from particular speech.
In Part II, I explain how audience analysis fits within the
architecture of First Amendment doctrine. Depending on the case,
the analysis can take place either at the front end, in the process of
categorizing the speech in question, or at the back end, in the
application of scrutiny analysis. These sorts of audience analyses
can look very different from each other, and in delineating these
differences, I focus on the two paradigmatic modes of analysis that
commonly arise within First Amendment jurisprudence. In the first,
audience analysis is conducted in order to determine, as a matter of
ex post categorization, whether particular statements made by a
particular speaker ought to be designated “low-value” speech
undeserving of First Amendment protection. In the second, audience
8. See Schauer, supra note 6.
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analysis is conducted on a more generalized level within First
Amendment “scrutiny” analysis, in which the goal is to evaluate the
extent to which government regulation of a particular subset of
constitutionally protected speech actually serves to advance the
government’s asserted regulatory interests.
In Part III, I address the question of how courts should conduct
audience analysis. I describe two general approaches that courts
might take: they could premise such analysis around a strong
normative ideal, such as a “rational,” sophisticated, thick-skinned
audience, or they could simply seek to predict, as accurately as
possible, the extent to which the targeted audience would actually
process the speech in a harmful manner. I argue that courts should
generally focus their analyses on accurately predicting how the
targeted audience will foreseeably process the speech, rather than
on envisioning how a hypothetical, idealized audience should
process the speech. If the general goal of First Amendment doctrine
is to identify the optimal balance between the value and harms of
speech, then it is only by focusing audience analysis on the question
of actual foreseeability that courts can properly calibrate the scope
of First Amendment protection in a given case.
In Part IV, I explore some ramifications of this theoretical
discussion on the ways in which courts currently conduct audience
analysis. I propose that courts, in delineating tests for low-value
speech, ought to frame audience analyses in clearly predictive terms
rather than in terms that might invite a highly normative approach;
I suggest that the “reasonable speaker” framework adopted by some
courts in the true threats context could serve as a sensible model.
Furthermore, with respect to more generalized scrutiny-stage
analyses, I endorse the Supreme Court’s apparently increasing
expectation of and solicitude for empirical evidence in conducting
audience analysis, and I argue that courts should generally err on
the side of empirical rigor rather than intuitive judgment in
undertaking such analyses.
Finally, I conclude with some thoughts as to why it is important
that courts frame and calibrate audience analysis around the
general goal of accurately estimating the likely harms that will
result from the targeted audience’s processing of speech. My goal in
this Article is not to argue for a general expansion or contraction of
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First Amendment protection; indeed, it may well be that adopting
the principles I propose will not have a substantial effect on the
results that courts reach. But knowing how much speech costs in a
wide variety of contexts—even if we might conclude that other
factors, such as the value of the speech, ultimately trump those
costs—has inherent value, both as a matter of judicial transparency
and as a matter of developing a more refined First Amendment
jurisprudence. With a clearer sense of the actual costs of speech
under different circumstances, courts will be better equipped to
judge exactly when the value of unfettered speech should be
preserved.
I. THE THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AUDIENCE
First Amendment doctrine is premised on the idea that unfet-
tered speech is valuable, either as an essential aspect of human
autonomy9 or insofar as it translates into a number of broad social
benefits, like aiding in the pursuit of truth10 or promoting a system
of democratic self-governance.11 But First Amendment doctrine is
also premised on an understanding that speech value must be
evaluated against the harms that might result from the speech.12
Thus, at least as a purely descriptive matter, the core of First
Amendment doctrine is, in essence, a balancing inquiry: does the
value of this speech outweigh the social harms associated with it?13
9. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA
L. REV. 964, 966 (1978); Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat
to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 232-34 (1992); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213-15 (1972).
10. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 87 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds.,
Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859).
11. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 25-27 (1948).
12. See TRIBE, supra note 4, at 792-93; Redish, supra note 4, at 624.
13. I do not mean to imply here that modern First Amendment doctrine must be
conceptualized in purely consequentialist or utilitarian terms. Rights-based theories of free
speech do not necessarily require that free speech rights trump regulatory interests at all
costs; rather, such rights may be conceptualized simply as “shields” that place on the state a
heightened burden to justify its regulation—a position that accords with the scrutiny
framework that is central to modern First Amendment doctrine. See Michael C. Dorf,
Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 52-53 (1998) (“Rights ...
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Of course, we do not live in an idealized world of all-knowing
judges who can precisely calculate the net social utility of speech
regulations.14 In reality, evaluating the value and costs of speech
involves many complicating factors. For example, uncertainty as to
where doctrinal lines are drawn or the possibility of judicial error
might risk chilling valuable speech,15 which might in turn lead to
broad structural decisions such as adopting bright-line categorical
rules rather than ad hoc balancing approaches.16 Or courts may tend
to undervalue the usually far-reaching and systemic benefits of
speech compared to the typically more immediate social harms
produced by that speech, which might call for ex ante doctrinal
adjustments.17 But at least as a broad, theoretical matter, the
primary goal of modern First Amendment jurisprudence is to
calibrate the scope of First Amendment protection correctly by
identifying the correct balance between the value of speech and the
social harms caused by that speech.18
In practice, the Supreme Court has focused its attention
primarily on sorting out the value side of the equation. With respect
to content-based restrictions on speech, the development of First
Amendment doctrine over the past century has largely been the
development of an extensive jurisprudence categorizing speech into
are not trumps in the sense that they exclude all consideration of consequences. Instead, they
are at most ‘shields’ against weak or unacceptable reasons for government action.”); Frederick
Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415, 429-30 (1993).
14. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis,
54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 740 (2002) (“[B]ecause the image of balancing costs and benefits
exaggerates the precision that is attainable in the First Amendment area, ... I prefer to call
the approach that I espouse to free speech issues the ‘pragmatic’ approach rather than the
‘balancing’ or ‘cost benefit’ approach.”).
15. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the
“Chilling Effect”, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 685 (1978).
16. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the
Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 275-76 (2009).
17. See Posner, supra note 14, at 744 (“[T]he costs of freedom of expression are often more
salient than the benefits, and their salience may cause the balance to shift too far toward
suppression.”); Frederick Schauer, The Wily Agitator and the American Free Speech Tradition,
57 STAN. L. REV. 2157, 2168 (2005) (observing that the First Amendment is “about imposing
constraints on even reasonable, well-intentioned, and empirically justified restrictions on
speech, and about doing so in the service of deeper or longer-term values”).
18. Of course, balancing speech value and harm is not the only question relevant to First
Amendment analysis. For example, the particular means that the government chooses to
regulate harmful speech also plays a significant role in determining the contours of First
Amendment protection.
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numerous categories and subcategories, each associated with
varying degrees of First Amendment value. For example, the Court
has established that obscenity carries no First Amendment value;19
that commercial speech carries less value than truthful political
speech;20 that speech on matters of public concern is more valuable
than speech on purely private matters;21 and so forth.
But the Court has given relatively short shrift to the issue of
speech-based harm. And crucial in understanding the nature of
speech-based harm is the issue of causation: How exactly does
speech bring about the harm in question?22 In this Part, I will first
walk through some of the basic mechanics of speech causation. In a
broad sense, speech can lead to harm in a variety of different ways,
whether from influencing listeners to commit harmful acts or from
directly inflicting harm onto the listener. I then highlight the
conceptual significance of the First Amendment audience. Regard-
less of which particular mechanism of speech-based causation is
involved, nearly every content-based assessment of speech-based
harm necessarily includes some sort of judgment regarding the
audience and the manner by which it will process the speech in
question. Although the particular judgments obviously vary from
case to case, they can be boiled down to two basic categories:
audience comprehension judgments and audience sensitivity
judgments.
A. The Mechanics of Speech Causation
There is no single manner by which speech causes harm; speech-
based harms can be produced in a variety of ways. In a recent
article, Frederick Schauer identified three particular categories of
harm, which he termed “harms of advocacy,” “harms of verbal
assault,” and “participant harms.”23 Schauer’s framework is a useful
starting point for unraveling the complexity of speech causation,
19. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
20. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
562-63 (1980). 
21. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011). 
22. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 5, at 301-04 (describing the significance of causation
questions in First Amendment theory and doctrine).
23. Id. at 97-104.
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and in this Section, I will summarize Schauer’s classification of
speech-based harm mechanisms, with some slight modifications. I
will focus in particular on three categories of harm, each of which
operates based on a distinct causal mechanism: reactive harm,
direct harm, and dissemination-based harm.24
1. Reactive Harm
Speech can cause harm because it influences the listener to react
to the speech in a certain way. That is, the speech spurs the listener
to undertake some action, which is what directly causes harm either
to the listener himself or to a third party.25 The incitement cases
represent a paradigmatic example of this mechanism of harm.26 If,
for example, a speaker exhorts his audience to take “revengeance”
against a particular minority group, the presumed harm that would
serve as the basis for state regulation is the possibility that such
speech would spur the listeners to undertake violent assaults on
persons and property.27 Or if Ozzy Osbourne releases a song
extolling the virtues of suicide, then the possibility exists that a
listener may be persuaded by the speech to inflict harm on himself.28
Schauer refers to these harms as “harms of advocacy”;29 I prefer
to call them “reactive harms” because, as Schauer himself notes, the
causal mechanism in question does not necessarily require that the
speaker advocate for the resultant harm or even intend that the
harm occur.30 The nub of this particular harm mechanism is that it
requires the reader to process the speech and to physically react to
it in a manner that produces harm.31 In cases of reactive harm, the
24. Of course, many potential disputes exist as to what types of harm may be the
legitimate subject of government regulation in the speech context. I am not generally
concerned with this issue for purposes of this Article, see infra text accompanying notes 139-
40; suffice it to say, plenty of harms exist that all will agree are relevant to evaluating the
appropriate scope of First Amendment protection.
25. Schauer, supra note 6, at 98. 
26. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969) (per curiam); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 371-72 (1927); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919). 
27. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446.
28. McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 190-91 (Ct. App. 1988).
29. Schauer, supra note 6, at 97.
30. Id. at 98-99.
31. See id. at 98.
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consequences of the listener’s reaction represent the harm sought to
be regulated by the government. Reactive harms therefore include
both harms resulting from audiences agreeing with the speaker’s
message—like the harm feared in Brandenburg v. Ohio32—and
harms resulting from audiences disagreeing with the speaker’s
message—like in the so-called “heckler’s veto” cases.33 And these
harms might not result from advocacy at all; the speech in question
may be a set of instructions,34 a basis for imitation,35 or even an
interactive video game.36 The distinguishing characteristic of
reactive harms is that they involve the active participation of the
listener, who will translate the information communicated to him
into harmful action.
2. Direct Harm
Under this mechanism of speech-based harm, speech inflicts
psychological harm on the listener in the direct manner that a
physical attack would inflict physical harm. Whereas reactive
harms result from the listener undertaking some sort of physical
action in response to the speech, direct harms require no such
action. Instead, they are inflicted on the listener simply as a result
of the speech itself.37 This causal mechanism can be seen clearly in
the context of “true threats.” If I credibly threaten to physically
injure someone, my speech would cause harm in the form of a direct
infliction of fear and discomfort on the listener, regardless of
whether I follow through with the act; psychological harm would be
inflicted on the listener simply as a result of his processing of my
32. 395 U.S. at 444-45.
33. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1969); Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315, 317-19 (1951). 
34. See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1997). In Rice, a man
murdered three people in a contract killing, following “detailed factual instructions on how
to murder and to become a professional killer” found in a book entitled Hit Man: A Technical
Manual for Independent Contractors. Id.
35. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1018-19 (5th Cir. 1987)
(death caused by autoerotic asphyxiation as described by magazine article); Olivia N. v. Nat’l
Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891 (Ct. App. 1981) (rape inspired by a scene in a television
movie). 
36. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2732-33 (2011).
37. Schauer, supra note 6, at 100-01. 
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speech. The same dynamic would apply in the context of “fighting
words”38 or any sort of highly offensive speech.39
This form of harm parallels what Schauer refers to as “harms of
verbal assault.”40 Schauer’s formulation is helpful insofar as it
characterizes speech, when used in this context, as more akin to a
cudgel or a fist than a means of advocacy or imparting information.41
I prefer the term “direct harm,” however, which emphasizes the
specific mechanism by which this speech translates into harm. The
listener—the one who is directly exposed to the speech—is harmed
simply as a result of hearing and processing the speech.
3. Dissemination-Based Harm
Speech can also cause harm to third parties simply because of
the content of the information disseminated. In other words, the
mere fact that the speech was communicated to an audience might
cause a third party to suffer harm. If, for example, one discloses
embarrassing private facts about another person to the general
public, the harm does not result from the listener processing the
information and acting on it in a particular way, but from the mere
fact that the information was disseminated to the listener, often
with the general assumption that the information disclosed will
continue to be passed on to others.42
What distinguishes dissemination-based harms from reactive
harms is the role of the listener in the chain of causation. Rather
38. E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
39. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1214 (2011); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 16 (1971). 
40. See Schauer, supra note 6, at 100-01.
41. Id. As many commentators have noted, the mechanism by which speech causes social
harm—for example, whether it causes harm by persuading a listener to do something versus
whether it does so by directly inflicting psychological trauma—might be deemed a significant
determinant of the speech’s value. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and
Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 335 (1991) (describing the “persuasion
principle,” wherein “the government may not suppress speech on the ground that the speech
is likely to persuade people to do something that the government considers harmful”). For
present purposes, however, I am not concerned with questions of speech value; rather, my sole
concern is delineating and describing the different causal mechanisms by which speech might
cause harm on the basis of its content.
42. See Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, 71 WASH. L. REV.
683, 722 (1996).
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than being rooted in the direct reaction the listener takes to the
speech—the listener translating speech to a particular harmful
act—dissemination-based harm is rooted in the mere fact that the
information has been injected into the realm of public knowledge
and discussion. In its purest form, this mechanism applies primarily
to the sorts of privacy-based harms inherent in publicly disclosing
private facts about another.43 But this mechanism also plays a key
role in understanding the harms that result from defamatory
speech, which can be conceptualized as a hybrid of reactive harms
and dissemination-based harms. Defamatory speech harms are
reactive insofar as they are ultimately rooted in how a direct or
remote listener translates the speech in question into harmful
action (that is, lowering one’s opinion of someone). But they are also
premised on dissemination to the extent that the harm rests on
public disclosure of the information; the direct listener’s only role in
causing the harm may be as a conduit of the information, which will
then get passed on to others who bring about the harm.
4. Other Harms
There are other causal means by which speech can lead to social
harm. Harm can result from conditions formed by the creation or
dissemination of speech. Schauer, for example, discusses “partici-
pant harms,” which are produced by the creation of a particular type
of speech, such as the animals harmed in producing the “crush
videos” in United States v. Stevens44 or the children harmed in
producing child pornography in New York v. Ferber.45 Speech can
also cause harm by creating or perpetuating particular social
attitudes that lead to harmful effects,46 or it might do so in the form
of speech-acts, in which the utterance of the speech is coextensive
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976).
44. 559 U.S. 460, 465 (2010); Schauer, supra note 6, at 103.
45. 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982); Schauer, supra note 6, at 103-04. 
46. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 321,
323-24 (1984) (“[P]ornography causes attitudes and behaviors of violence and discrimination
which define the treatment and status of half of the population.”); Matsuda, supra note 7, at
2337 (observing that hate speech causes victims to suffer emotional distress and to “curtail
their own exercise of speech rights”). Although many of these speech-based harms would be
reactive or direct in nature, other harms would result from the general shifting of social mores
that renders harmful behavior more socially acceptable. 
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with a particular act.47 Speech may cause harm by purely physical
means—for example, being kept up at night by a loud concert.48
But the bulk of content-based regulations are targeted towards
speech’s capacity to cause reactive harm, direct harm, or dissem-
ination-based harm. And for each of these causal mechanisms, the
audience’s processing of the speech constitutes an integral link in
the chain of causation. Speech cannot cause reactive harm without
the audience translating the speech into action; it cannot cause
direct harm without the audience internalizing the speech in a
harmful manner; and it cannot cause dissemination-based harm
without the audience grasping harmful content from the speech
presented to it. Thus, in order to determine the extent to which
particular speech causes regulable social harms, courts must make
judgments as to how the speech would be processed by the audience.
B. Audience Judgments in First Amendment Analysis
When courts are tasked with evaluating the reactive harms,
direct harms, or dissemination-based harms caused by speech, they
must necessarily analyze how the speech will interact with the
audience. Although the specific audience judgments that courts
must make vary from case to case, all of these judgments fall into
two broad categories: judgments concerning how audiences will
comprehend the speech in question and those concerning how
sensitive audiences will be to such speech.
1. Comprehension
In essentially all cases dealing with content-based speech
regulation, courts must make judgments as to how the audience will
interpret the speech in question. Whether the harm in question is
reactive harm, direct harm, or dissemination-based harm, it cannot
occur unless the audience comprehends the speech in a particular
manner. In many cases, of course, this is a simple issue; there are
only so many ways shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater may be
interpreted. But inherent to any analysis of content-based harm is
47. For example, an order of excommunication or declaring someone ineligible for benefits.
48. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784 (1989).
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a basic judgment as to how the speech in question might be
understood by the audience.
For example, in Morse v. Frederick, a high school student was
disciplined for holding up a fourteen-foot banner with the phrase
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school event.49 Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that “deterring drug use by
schoolchildren is an ‘important—indeed, perhaps compelling’
interest”;50 as a result, whether the speech was protected effectively
rested on how it might be interpreted.51 Although noting that the
message was “cryptic,” the Court found “plainly ... reasonable” the
school principal’s interpretation that the banner would be viewed as
“promoting illegal drug use.”52 The Court observed that “the phrase
could be interpreted as an imperative: ‘[Take] bong hits…,’ ” or could
be read as a celebration of drug use.53 The Court therefore upheld
the school’s punishment of the student. In dissent, Justice Stevens
stated that the Court’s argument “practically refutes itself.”54 In his
view, the phrase was simply a “nonsense message, not advocacy,”
noting that “it takes real imagination to read a ‘cryptic’ message …
with a slanting drug reference as an incitement to drug use.”55
Comprehension issues also lie at the heart of cases involving
defamation by implication, in which courts must similarly make
judgments as to how the audience will interpret the allegedly de-
famatory speech in question.56 For example, in Memphis Publishing
49. 551 U.S. 393, 397-98 (2007).
50. Id. at 407 (quoting Veronia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)). 
51. See id. at 401.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 402.
54. Id. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 782
(5th ed. 1984) (“A publication may be defamatory upon its face; or it may carry a defamatory
meaning only by reason of extrinsic circumstances.”). See generally Clay Calvert, Awareness
of Meaning in Libel Law: An Interdisciplinary Communication & Law Critique, 16 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 111, 133 (1995); Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, When Is the Truth Not the Truth? Truth
Telling and Libel by Implication, 12 COMM. L. & POL’Y 341, 361 (2007). Comprehension issues
may arise in evaluating truth or falsity of a statement, or they may arise in evaluating
whether a statement is defamatory—that is, whether it would so “harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977); see DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 404, at 1131 (2000) (“The meaning of words, pictures or other
communicative elements is critical not only on the issue of defamatory quality but also on the
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Co. v. Nichols, the defendant published an article that stated, in
relevant part:
Officers said the [shooting] took place Thursday night after the
suspect arrived at the Nichols home and found her husband
there with Mrs. Nichols. Witnesses said the suspect first fired a
shot at her husband and then at Mrs. Nichols, striking her in
the arm, police reported.57
Although all of the facts in the article were true on their face, the
court held that, as a matter of law, the article was capable of leading
the reader to conclude, by implication, that Nichols had an affair
with the suspect’s husband.58 By contrast, in Loeb v. New Times
Communications Corp., the court deemed the plaintiff’s allegations
of defamation by implication “strained, unreasonable, and unjusti-
fied.”59 Among other things, the article published by the defendant
stated that the plaintiff’s legal career “abruptly ended when he
failed to make it through Harvard Law School”;60 the court rejected
the plaintiff’s argument that this statement implied that “he was
forced to leave law school because of academic failure” when he had
actually left voluntarily.61
In all of these examples, regulable harm resulted from the
speech only to the extent that the audience would interpret the
speech to hold a harmful meaning. There are numerous other cases
that revolve around audience comprehension judgments, dealing
with subsets of speech such as true threats62 and incitement.63 That
this issue has emerged in many First Amendment harm analyses is
unsurprising; speech is often slippery and can be subject to a wide
range of interpretations. But in nearly every First Amendment case
analyzing content-based regulations of speech, courts must make
some sort of judgment, whether explicit or implicit, as to how the
issue of truth or falsity.”).
57. 569 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tenn. 1978).
58. Id. at 419.
59. 497 F. Supp. 85, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (quoting Tracy v. Newsday, Inc., 155 N.E.2d 853,
855 (N.Y. 1959)).
60. Id. at 89.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356 (4th Cir. 1973).
63. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
2014] FIRST AMENDMENT AUDIENCE ANALYSIS 1665
audience will comprehend the speech in question, because the chain
of causation between speech and harm will depend on the audience
interpreting the speech in a certain way.
2. Sensitivity
In cases dealing with reactive harms and direct harms, courts
must make judgments not only regarding the audience’s comprehen-
sion of the speech in question, but also regarding its sensitivity to
the speech.64 That is, they must make a judgment as to how the
speech—assuming that it is understood by the audience in a
particular way—will affect the audience.
The particular audience sensitivity judgments that courts must
make differ based on whether a case involves reactive harms or
direct harms. In cases involving reactive harms, courts must
determine the extent to which audiences will translate the speech
in question into harmful action. What will the speech influence the
audience to do, and how likely is it that they will do it?
The Supreme Court’s incitement cases illustrate the sorts of
audience sensitivity judgments courts must make in cases involving
reactive harms. Both the traditional “clear and present danger”
test65 and the present-day Brandenburg test66 require courts to
make some judgment as to the extent to which the advocacy in
question would translate into harmful action. Thus, for example, in
Frohwerk v. United States, Justice Holmes, writing for the Court,
upheld the conviction of a newspaper publisher who had published
articles encouraging people to resist the draft.67 In doing so, Holmes
64. By definition, dissemination-based harms rest only on the fact that certain
information has been communicated, so the audience need only understand the speech for the
harm to have occurred. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
65. This test, formulated by Justice Holmes in Schenk v. United States, held that
dangerous advocacy could be regulated when the speech is “used in such circumstances and
[is] of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that [it] will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.” 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
66. Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force
or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).
67. 249 U.S. 204, 205, 210 (1919). The Court’s decision was presumably based on the
“clear and present danger” standard, which, although not specifically mentioned in Frohwerk,
had been set forth by Holmes only a week earlier in Schenk. See Schenk, 249 U.S. at 52.
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bemoaned the lack of a complete factual record, such as the
circulation size of the newspaper in question,68 but ultimately
premised the Court’s decision on the possibility that “the circulation
of the paper was in quarters where a little breath would be enough
to kindle a flame and that the fact was known and relied upon by
those who sent the paper out.”69 Thus, the Court’s judgment rested
on the theoretical possibility that at least certain audiences would
be sufficiently sensitive to translate the speech into harmful action.
Holmes’s views would soon change dramatically. In his famous
dissent in Abrams v. United States—in which the Court upheld the
criminal conviction of a leaflet publisher—Holmes stated that
“nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly
leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any
immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the
government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so.”70
Thus, Holmes in Abrams was willing to make what was, on its face,
a very different judgment regarding the sensitivity of the audience,71
presuming that the audience was not so sensitive as to be swayed
to harmful action by a “silly leaflet by an unknown man.”72
These sorts of audience sensitivity judgments regarding listen-
ers’ likely physical response to speech are relevant to all cases
involving reactive harms. Thus, such judgments—whether explicit
or implicit—play a key role in determining the extent to which, for
example, violent video games,73 a book instructing readers how to
become a contract killer,74 or the wearing of protest armbands in a
school setting75 may be constitutionally regulated.
The audience sensitivity judgments that courts must make in
cases involving direct harm are slightly different in character. In
68. Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 209.
69. Id.
70. 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71. See Steven J. Heyman, The Dark Side of the Force: The Legacy of Justice Holmes for
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 661, 679-82 (2011) (speculating
as to the reasons for the change in Holmes’s views).
72. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
73. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735-38 (2011).
74. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2000). 
75. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (deeming
the suspension of students for wearing armbands at school unconstitutional in the absence
of “facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption
of or material interference with school activities”).
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these cases, the relevant question is not the extent to which the
audience will physically react to speech, but the audience’s psycho-
logical vulnerability to speech. That is, to what extent is the
audience likely to suffer emotional harm as a direct result of
assaultive speech?
Take, for example, the famous case of Cohen v. California, in
which Cohen was arrested for disturbing the peace because he wore
a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” in a Los Angeles
courthouse.76 The Supreme Court premised its reversal of Cohen’s
conviction in part on its judgment regarding the audience’s sensitiv-
ity to the offensive speech in question. In reaching its decision, the
Court downplayed the extent to which the audience of Cohen’s
speech—people within the Los Angeles courthouse—would or should
incur emotional harm as a result of the offensive content of the
speech, asserting that the audience “could effectively avoid further
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.”77
By contrast, in Lehman v. Shaker Heights, a plurality of the Court
upheld a city ban on posted political advertisements on the city’s
public transportation, observing that “[u]sers would be subjected to
the blare of political propaganda.”78 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Douglas observed that “the man on the streetcar has no choice but
to sit and listen, or perhaps to sit and to try not to listen.”79 Thus, an
essential component of the Court’s decisions in Cohen and
Lehman—two cases dealing with direct harm—was a judgment
regarding the audience’s vulnerability to emotional harm resulting
from the speech in question.
Like in cases involving reactive harms, cases dealing with direct
harms necessarily require courts to make some sort of judgment,
whether implicitly or explicitly, regarding the audience’s sensitivity
to the speech in question—specifically, the audience’s psychological
vulnerability to the speech. Such judgments thus play a central role
76. 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
77. Id.
78. 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion).
79. Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S.
451, 469 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
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in evaluating the harms resulting from, for example, commercial
speech,80 true threats,81 or fighting words.82
3. Summary
In the vast majority of cases in which the government regulates
speech on the basis of its content, the speech-based harm that the
government seeks to regulate occurs through the intermediary of an
audience in the form of reactive harms, direct harms, or
dissemination-based harms. Thus, in order to properly measure and
analyze these harms, courts must necessarily make judgments
regarding the relationship between the audience and the speech. In
nearly all cases, the court must consider how the audience will
comprehend the speech in question, and in cases involving reactive
and direct harms, it must also consider how that speech will affect
the audience, either by spurring the audience to harmful action or
by inflicting psychological harm.
II. AUDIENCE ANALYSIS WITHIN THE ARCHITECTURE OF FIRST
AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
Courts’ judgments regarding the First Amendment audience
play a significant role in calibrating the balance between the value
of free speech and the social harms that are caused by such speech.
Whenever speech is regulated based on its content, the chain of
causation leading to the associated harms typically runs through an
audience, and courts cannot calculate the harm caused by the
speech in question without making judgments as to how audiences
will process the speech.
In this Part, I discuss how audience analysis is conducted within
the framework of current First Amendment doctrine. A court
evaluating a content-based speech regulation under the First
Amendment must necessarily make two separate judgments. First,
the court must categorize the speech in question, either by placing
it in a predefined speech-value category or by creating a new
80. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71-72 (1983).
81. See, e.g., Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 616, 622-23 (8th Cir.
2002). 
82. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
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category or subcategory. The court must then apply the scrutiny
analysis corresponding to the speech category in question. Thus, for
example, in a challenge to a content-based ordinance banning
direct-mail advertising of contraceptives, the court must first
determine whether the speech in question is commercial speech or
fully protected core speech. Then, based on the category, the court
must apply the corresponding scrutiny analysis (the intermediate-
scrutiny Central Hudson test for commercial speech or strict
scrutiny for core speech).83
Depending on the nature of the case, audience analysis can occur
at either the categorization or the scrutiny stage, and the sorts of
analyses that courts undertake can vary widely. To illustrate these
differences, I focus on two paradigmatic modes of audience analysis.
In the first, audience analysis is conducted in order to determine, as
a matter of ex post categorization, whether particular statements
made by a particular speaker ought to be categorized as low-value
speech undeserving of First Amendment protection. In the second,
audience analysis is conducted as part of a more generalized
scrutiny-stage analysis, with the goal of determining the extent to
which government regulation of a particular subset of constitution-
ally protected speech actually serves to advance the government’s
asserted regulatory interests. I walk through these two modes of
audience analysis in turn.
A. Case-Specific Audience Analysis in Categorizing “Borderline
Speech”
In May 1994, Richard Egan, an FBI agent, investigated a
complaint filed by Kevan Fulmer, who had alleged that his former
father-in-law and his brother had failed to disclose assets at bank-
ruptcy and committed fraud.84 During the investigation, Egan
stayed in constant communication with Fulmer, who Egan described
as “polite, articulate,” and “tense.”85 Fulmer frequently discussed
the strained relationship he had with his family, characterizing his
father-in-law and brother as “vicious” people who had “used the
83. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 64-74. 
84. United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1489 (1st Cir. 1997).
85. Id.
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courts to keep him away from his family.”86 After conducting his
investigation, Egan informed Fulmer that the record did not support
a prosecution, a decision that Fulmer protested.87
Three months later, Egan received the following voicemail from
Fulmer:
Hi Dick, Kevan Fulmer. Hope things are well, hope you had an
enjoyable Easter and all the other holidays since I’ve spoken
with you last. I want you to look something up. It’s known as
misprision. Just think of it in terms of misprision of a felony.
Hope all is well. The silver bullets are coming. I’ll talk to you.
Enjoy the intriguing unraveling of what I said to you. Talk to
you, Dick. It’s been a pleasure. Take care.88
Fulmer was indicted for threatening a federal officer.89 Egan
testified that he was “shocked” by the “chilling” and “scary”
message.90 In particular, he believed that the term “silver bullets”
used by Fulmer indicated a threat of violence.91 His supervisor
testified that Egan appeared “clearly upset, concerned, [and]
agitated.”92 Fulmer, for his part, presented two witnesses who
testified that Fulmer had used the phrase “silver bullets” to describe
“a clear-cut simple violation of law”—specifically, “information that
he was going to provide to banks proving the illegality of some of
[his brother’s] transactions.”93
After the jury returned a verdict against Fulmer, he appealed to
the First Circuit. The court applied a “reasonable speaker” standard
for judging whether the statement constituted a threat, stating that
“a defendant may be convicted for making a threat [when] he should
have reasonably foreseen that the statement he uttered would be
taken as a threat by those to whom it is made.”94 Finding the
evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict on this basis, the court
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1489-90.
88. Id. at 1490.
89. Id. at 1489; see 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) (2006).




94. Id. at 1491.
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observed that “a conviction under this statute, based on a finding
that the statement was a true threat, would not violate Fulmer’s
constitutionally protected right to speech.”95
In Fulmer, the audience analysis undertaken by the jury and the
reviewing court took place, as a doctrinal matter, within the first
step of First Amendment analysis—in deciding whether the speech
in question should be categorized as one of the low-value categories
of speech afforded no special protection under the First Amendment
(here, true threats).96 Under the test adopted by the First Circuit,
the initial judgment regarding the categorical value of the speech
rested directly on judgments regarding the harm that might be
caused by the speech. That is, whether Fulmer’s speech was
classified as an unprotected true threat was based on the extent to
which the speech might be processed by the audience in a harmful
way—how the audience might comprehend the speech and how
sensitive it might be to suffering psychological harm as a result.
Fulmer represents one paradigmatic mode of audience analysis:
the highly context-specific, ex post, “borderline speech” case in
which particular speech falls somewhere along the boundary
between low-value speech and protected core speech. The relevant
question in Fulmer was whether the specific statement made by
Fulmer to Egan, within the particular context in which it was made,
constituted a true threat that can be freely regulated under the
95. Id. at 1493.
96. The Supreme Court has not clearly delineated a constitutional definition for
unprotected true threats. Prior to the Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343
(2003), lower courts had generally defined “true threats” based on some form of objective
standard. See, e.g., United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973) (whether
“an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the [speech] would
interpret it as a threat of injury”). In Black, the Court stated, somewhat ambiguously, that
“ ‘[t]rue threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual
or group of individuals.” 538 U.S. at 359. Some courts and commentators have read Black to
require that the speaker subjectively intend the speech to be a threat. See, e.g., United States
v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 633 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We are therefore bound to conclude that speech
may be deemed unprotected by the First Amendment as a ‘true threat’ only upon proof that
the speaker subjectively intended the speech as a threat.”); Frederick Schauer, Intentions,
Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197,
217. However, “[f]ollowing Black, the vast majority of courts continued to use one of the
objective intent standards that saturated the pre-Black landscape.” Paul T. Crane, Note,
“True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1261 (2006); see also id. at 1261-64
(collecting cases).
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First Amendment. This sort of inquiry is necessarily fact-intensive:
What exactly does “silver bullets” mean? What was the relationship
between Fulmer and Egan? How much should it matter that Egan
actually felt threatened by Fulmer’s voicemail message?
This sort of context-specific audience analysis arises in all cases
in which a speaker faces liability based on speech that falls within
the hazy interstices between low-value and protected speech.
Beyond true threats, all categories of low-value speech are defined,
at least in part, in terms of the extent to which the audience will
process the speech in a harmful manner.97 Brandenburg, for
example, dictates that speech cannot constitute incitement unless
it is “likely to incite or produce [imminent lawless] action.”98 Miller
v. California dictates that speech is obscene only if “the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.”99
And Cohen characterizes “fighting words” as those “which, when
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common
knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.”100 The
same is true of fraud and defamation, both of which, under the
common law, require some causal link between the allegedly
harmful speech and an actual or presumed social harm.101
Audience analysis can thus occur in the context of categorizing
particular utterances—specifically, in determining whether
borderline speech should be categorized as freely regulable low-
value speech or protected core speech.102 In this mode of audience
97. By “low-value speech,” I mean the categories of speech for which courts have granted
little to no special protection under the First Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010) (setting forth some of these categories). This does not include
partially protected speech such as commercial speech or speech in public schools. See infra
notes 117-18.
98. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
99. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
100. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (“A communication is defamatory
if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 56, § 108, at 749-54 (discussing the reliance requirement in fraud cases).
102. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 159-61 (1974) (obscenity); Cohen, 403 U.S.
at 20 (fighting words); Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 416 F.3d 320, 331 (4th Cir. 2005) (defamation
by implication); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1987)
(incitement). 
2014] FIRST AMENDMENT AUDIENCE ANALYSIS 1673
analysis, courts must make an ex post, context-specific judgment as
to how the audience might process the speech in question in order
to properly categorize the speech. Once the classification determina-
tion has been made, the rest of the analysis is usually straightfor-
ward. If, for example, speech is deemed low-value incitement, then
it has, by definition, negligible First Amendment value and can
generally be regulated freely;103 on the other hand, if it is deemed to
be core protected speech, then strict scrutiny applies, which will
almost always mean that the speech is insulated from criminal or
civil liability.104
B. Generalized Audience Analysis Within the Scrutiny Framework
Fulmer illustrates one paradigmatic mode of audience analy-
sis—the ex post, context-specific analysis of a particular utterance
that occurs in categorizing borderline speech. The Supreme Court’s
decision in Edenfield v. Fane105 illustrates the other paradigmatic
mode of audience analysis: a highly generalized “scrutiny” analysis
of how an audience might process a designated subset of protected
speech that the government has sought to regulate.
In Edenfield, Florida’s Board of Accountancy established a rule
that generally prohibited CPAs from “direct, in-person, uninvited”
client solicitations.106 Scott Fane, a CPA licensed in Florida, sued
the Board for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the rule
violated the First Amendment.107 Characterizing the regulated
speech as commercial speech, the Court applied the intermediate
scrutiny standard set forth in Central Hudson.108 In determining
whether the Board met its burden under the third prong of the
Central Hudson test—“whether the challenged regulation advances
103. See Richard C. Ausness, The Application of Product Liability Principles to Publishers
of Violent or Sexually Explicit Material, 52 FLA. L. REV. 603, 641 (2000) (“[C]ourts will
normally uphold restrictions, or even complete prohibitions, of low-value speech as long as the
government can show a rational basis for its actions.”).
104. See, e.g., Patricia Millett et al., Mixed Signals: The Roberts Court and Free Speech in
the 2009 Term, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 38 (2010) (“[I]n the First Amendment context, the
Court has adhered closely to the late Professor Gunther’s famous maxim that strict scrutiny
is ‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
106. Id. at 764.
107. Id. at 763-64.
108. Id. at 765-67.
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[the government’s regulatory] interests in a direct and material
way”109—the Court examined the evidence presented by the Board
to support its assertion that those subjected to uninvited in-person
solicitations from CPAs would suffer a loss of privacy and be at risk
of fraud or deception.110
In scrutinizing the Board’s evidence, the Court noted that the
state’s burden “is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture;
rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on
commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are
real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree.”111 It noted that the Board “present[ed] no studies that
suggest personal solicitation of prospective business clients by
CPA’s creates the dangers of fraud, overreaching, or compromised
independence that the Board claims to fear.”112 The Court criticized
the Board’s primary reliance on “conclusory statements” in a single
affidavit from a former member of the Board.113 And it cited other
evidence regarding personal solicitation by CPAs suggesting that
the Board’s concerns were off-base.114 As a result of this analysis,
the Court held that “[t]he Board has not demonstrated that, as
applied in the business context, the ban on CPA solicitation
advances its asserted interests in any direct and material way,” and
it struck down the regulation.115
The Court’s audience analysis in Edenfield differs from the
analysis undertaken in Fulmer in multiple ways. First, as a
doctrinal matter, the analysis arises not as a function of the initial
speech categorization process, but rather at the back-end scrutiny
stage of the analysis. As noted above, all low-value speech categories
are defined, at least in part, based on the speech’s capacity to cause
harm when processed by the audience.116 But when these categories
of low-value speech do not come into play, speech is presumed to
have some degree of First Amendment protection, and when the
government seeks to regulate such speech based on content,
109. Id. at 767.
110. Id. at 770-73.
111. Id. at 770-71.
112. Id. at 771.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 772-73.
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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audience analysis occurs within the application of either intermedi-
ate or strict scrutiny.117 Both standards call for the government to
assert its regulatory interest (that is, the social harm resulting from
the speech that it wishes to prevent) and to establish a causal
connection between the regulated speech and the asserted
interest.118
Second, the underlying issue in Edenfield is not borderline
speech—speech that implicates the hazy borders surrounding
doctrinal or regulatory speech categories.119 Here, there is no
question that the regulation targets commercial speech—a category
that, unlike the low-value speech categories, is defined purely in
terms of the speech’s substance rather than its potential to cause
harm—and the scope of the regulation is similarly defined, on its
face, purely in terms of substance rather than the potential harmful
effects of the speech. Unlike in Fulmer, the goal of the Court’s
audience analysis in Edenfield is to determine whether the govern-
ment is justified in regulating a clearly delineated subset of speech;
117. Outside of the low-value speech categories, speech is generally categorized purely in
terms of its substance rather than in terms of its capacity to cause harm. For example,
commercial speech is “usually defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction.” United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001). And core protected
speech does not generally have an established definition; rather, it is best conceptualized as
the default category for all speech that is not defined to be low-value (such as fighting words)
or partially protected (such as commercial speech). See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s
Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 801 n.3. 
118. If the speech the government seeks to regulate does not fall into a special category of
lesser-protected speech, then strict scrutiny applies, under which the regulation can survive
only if it is “narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.” See, e.g., Perry Educ.
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). Whether the regulation serves
“a compelling state interest” is, of course, a function of whether it covers speech that will be
processed by the audience in a manner that produces regulable social harm. See Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2417, 2422 (1996) (“For a law to be narrowly tailored, the government must prove
to the Court’s satisfaction that the law actually advances the interest.”). If the speech is
deemed to be commercial speech, or if the speech regulation occurs within certain
institutional contexts, then some form of intermediate scrutiny applies. See, e.g., Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-66 (1980)
(commercial speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14
(1969) (speech in public schools). Although the specific formulations of these standards vary,
they also invariably include an analysis of whether the audience will process the regulated
speech in a harmful manner. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (requiring a
determination of “whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted”). 
119. See supra Part II.A.
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to frame this in another way, the government has “frozen” a chunk
of speech out of public discourse, and the Court’s job is to scrutinize
the government’s harm calculus in undertaking such regulation.
Finally, the posture of Edenfield necessitates an audience
analysis that is far more generalized than the sort of analysis
conducted in Fulmer. The Court did not need to delve, ex post, into
any particular case-specific facts or contextual detail in undertaking
its analysis, and there was no dispute regarding either the constitu-
tional categorization of the regulated speech or the clarity of the
regulation’s coverage.120 Thus, unlike in Fulmer—in which the jury
or court would have to evaluate the various contextual details
surrounding the statement itself, Fulmer’s relationship with Egan,
Egan’s disposition, and so forth—the Edenfield Court looked only to
the regulation itself, and its inquiry was simply to test the general
connection between that regulation and the government’s asserted
interest.121
This sort of generalized, scrutiny-based audience analysis
naturally arises in cases involving challenges to clear, content-based
regulations on protected speech. This includes not only cases that,
like Edenfield, deal with government regulations of commercial
speech,122 but also cases involving strict scrutiny review of regula-
tions targeting fully protected speech—for example, cases dealing
with regulations on violent video games123 or on campaign-related
speech in close proximity to polling areas.124
Thus, audience analysis can arise at either the categorization
stage or the scrutiny stage of First Amendment analysis, and such
analysis can occur in two paradigmatic modes. Sometimes this
analysis is conducted in a highly case-specific and contextualized
manner: Should this particular speech, uttered in these particular
circumstances, be categorized as low-value speech? And other times,
this analysis is conducted on a much more generalized level: Does
120. See supra Part II.A.
121. See supra Part II.A.
122. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553 (2001); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481 (1995); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 63
(1983). 
123. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
124. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193 (1992).
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government regulation of a designated subset of protected speech
actually advance its regulatory goals?
I now move on to the question of how courts should perform such
audience analyses. In Part III, I compare two broad approaches that
courts might take, ultimately concluding that the fundamental goal
of audience analysis should be to forecast, as accurately as possible,
the extent to which the targeted audience will actually process the
speech in a harmful manner. And in Part IV, I explore how this
basic proposition might influence the ways in which courts currently
conduct audience analysis.
III. THE THEORETICAL GOALS OF FIRST AMENDMENT AUDIENCE
ANALYSIS
How should courts conduct audience analysis? Broadly speaking,
there are two general approaches that courts might take. On the one
hand, courts could premise such analysis around a particular
normative ideal—for example, a “rational,” sophisticated, thick-
skinned audience. On the other hand, they could simply seek to
predict, as accurately as possible, the extent to which the targeted
audience would actually process the speech in a harmful manner.
Although, as I will discuss later, these two approaches represent
different directions on a spectrum rather than distinct modes of
analysis, I argue that the baseline for First Amendment audience
analysis should generally be an actual, foreseeable audience rather
than a hypothetical, idealized one. If First Amendment jurispru-
dence is, at its core, an exercise of balancing the value of speech
against its associated social harms, then only by ascertaining, as
accurately as possible, the extent to which audiences will actually
process speech in a harmful manner can courts correctly calibrate
the scope of First Amendment protection in a given circumstance.
A. Idiosyncratic Audiences and the Shortcomings of Pure
Effects-Based Tests
To begin our exploration of the potential approaches that courts
might take in conducting audience analysis, let us return to the
facts of Fulmer. As you will recall, that case ultimately turned on
the question of whether Fulmer’s message to Egan that “[t]he silver
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bullets are coming” constituted a true threat for First Amendment
purposes.125 If so, then, as low-value speech, it would be freely
subject to criminal punishment. If not, it would presumably be fully
protected speech, and under strict scrutiny, the prosecution would
almost certainly fail. As discussed above, whether speech consti-
tutes a true threat is generally premised on the extent to which the
speech causes social harm—here, fear and intimidation in the mind
of the audience.126
So how might a court calculate the harm resulting from Fulmer’s
speech? The most direct approach might be to simply look at the
real-world effects of the speech and base its categorization decision
on how the listener actually processed the speech. So the court
might simply note that Egan actually understood the speech to be
threatening and actually felt threatened as a result. On this basis,
it could classify Fulmer’s speech as a true threat that does not
warrant any constitutional protection; after all, the severe harm
suffered by Egan would presumably trump the limited speech value
of Fulmer’s voicemail message.
Although this seems straightforward enough, courts have not
adopted this sort of pure actual-effects test in cases like Fulmer for
obvious reasons. People can process speech in a wide variety of
ways, and it is often impossible to predict, ex ante, how exactly
particular audience members might respond to the speech. For
example, suppose that someone delivers a formal lecture about the
virtues of healthy eating to an audience. A particularly excitable
and hotheaded audience member somehow interprets the speech as
an incitement to “fight back” against unhealthy foods and as a
result vandalizes a nearby fast-food restaurant.127 Basing the
liability of the speaker on the actual harm incurred in such a case
would appear fundamentally unfair, since the harm resulted from
the listener’s highly idiosyncratic response to the speech—one that
nobody, including the speaker, reasonably could have expected. One
way to illuminate this point is to reframe the issue in tort terms.
Although there would be little doubt that the speech was a cause-in-
125. United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1490-93 (1st Cir. 1997).
126. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
127. Of course, such speech would not, in fact, be punishable under the Brandenburg
standard, which requires express incitement. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)
(per curiam). My purpose here is simply to examine audience analysis on a theoretical level. 
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fact of the harm,128 there would also be little doubt that the speech
was not a proximate cause of the harm.129 Rather, the listener’s
highly idiosyncratic response to the speech would likely be deemed
a superseding cause of the harm that resulted, since it would be
normatively unfair to attribute such harm to the speaker’s
actions.130
Furthermore, apart from purely normative concerns, a pure
actual-effects test that does not account for idiosyncratic audience
responses would create massive chilling effects. If I could be
potentially liable for anyone’s idiosyncratic reaction to my speech,
then I would certainly be hesitant to speak ex ante.131 Thus, any sort
of ex post audience analysis premised solely on the audience’s
actual, historical processing of the speech would incur a massive
social cost: if speakers have to adjust their speech, ex ante, to
account for all possible idiosyncratic responses to that speech, then
a significant amount of valuable speech will be left unsaid.
So when a court is tasked with judging, ex post, whether certain
speech should be regulable as low-value speech, it cannot look solely
to what actually happened because it has to account for the problem
of idiosyncratic audience response. And of course, there may be no
actual consequences to look at in a particular case; for instance, the
speaker could be charged with violating a criminal threat statute
before the target of the threat is even made aware of it.132 Thus,
128. A person’s conduct cannot be deemed the cause of an event “if the event would not
have occurred but for that conduct.” KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, § 41, at 266. Causation in
fact is thus, on its face, a purely empirical question: was the act in question an essential part
of the causal chain leading to the harmful result?
129. Unlike determinations of but-for cause, which are empirical in nature, determinations
of proximate cause are based on normative considerations—the extent to which legal
responsibility ought to extend for the consequences of tortious actions. See, e.g., Richard W.
Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal
Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (2001). Proximate cause effectively acts as a
catch-all term encompassing all of the policy-based considerations courts have for limiting
liability even when factual causation exists. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, § 42, at 273.
130. I discuss the connection between First Amendment audience analysis and the issue
of “superseding” or “intervening” cause in greater detail below. See infra Part III.C.
131. Cf. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (observing that an actual-
effects test “puts the speaker ... wholly at the mercy of the varied understanding of his
hearers” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976))).
132. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (2006) (establishing criminal penalties for anyone who
“knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail ... any letter, paper, writing,
print, missive, or document containing any threat to take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict
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courts must conduct audience analysis via some sort of ex ante
judgment as to how much harm the speech would reasonably
cause—that is, a judgment as to which audience reactions to speech
are so natural or foreseeable that the associated harm should be
imputed to the speaker, and which are so idiosyncratic as to break
the chain of causation.133
B. Predictive Versus Normative Approaches to Audience Analysis
Thus, in cases like Fulmer, courts ought to apply some form of
objective test rather than an actual-effects test in conducting
audience analysis.134 But in implementing such an objective test,
how should courts determine what ought to count as a harm that
can be imputed to the regulated speech? Generally speaking, courts
could choose between two broadly different approaches to this
question. They might assume a strongly normative vision of an
idealized rational audience and project how such an audience should
process speech.135 Or they could seek to predict, in a more empirical
and contextual manner, how the particular targeted audience in
question would likely or foreseeably process the speech.
An illustration may be helpful to delineate between these two
approaches.136 Suppose that a neo-Nazi organization holds a rally in
bodily harm upon the President of the United States”). Unlike in the tort context, criminal
liability often attaches for inchoate wrongs—that is, wrongful acts where harm has not yet
been realized. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA.
L. REV. 1625, 1636 (2002) (“Criminal law sometimes prohibits and punishes genuinely
inchoate wrongs—uncompleted wrongful acts. Tort law does not.”).
133. Of course, evidence of actual harm in a case could serve as a useful data point in
making this sort of ex ante determination. See, e.g., United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d
1569, 1571 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The fact that the victim acts as if he believed the threat is
evidence that he did believe it, and the fact that he believed it is evidence that it could
reasonably be believed and therefore that it is a threat.”).
134. As I discuss below, courts, in defining the contours of low-value speech categories,
have generally adopted some form of objective measure of harm, although the exact
formulations vary. See infra notes 197-205. 
135. They could also presumably premise their analyses on the opposite normative vision of
a highly unsophisticated, thin-skinned, and irrational audience. Given the significant weight
accorded to free speech values in contemporary American culture and jurisprudence, however,
one rarely encounters arguments for this sort of highly unprotective normative baseline. Fur-
thermore, adopting such a standard would raise the same sorts of chilling and fairness con-
cerns inherent to the “idiosyncratic audience” problem discussed above. See supra Part III.A.
136. The facts of this example are loosely based on Village of Skokie v. National Socialist
Party of America, 373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978).
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a town full of Holocaust survivors. The rally includes much hateful
invective, and in one particular speech, the speaker, after discussing
his general admiration for the “ethnic purity” policies of the Third
Reich, looks into the crowd and opines that the organization hopes
to “finish the job the Nazis started.” After the event, the speaker is
charged under a criminal statute prohibiting true threats. A court
might try to determine whether the particular audience in that town
is, as a predictive matter, reasonably likely to feel actually threat-
ened by the speech, and choose to allocate these harms to the speech
itself based on this determination. On the other hand, it might
decide that whatever the likely effects of the speech might be, the
“sticks and stones” principle dictates that rational people ought to
be thick-skinned against even such horrible invective, and thus any
harm should be allocated to the audience’s idiosyncratic reaction to
the speech rather than to the speech itself.
In order to properly frame the following discussion, some initial
clarifications are warranted. First, in discussing the ways in which
courts might conduct audience analysis, I focus solely on the
question of harm calculation—that is, how courts should calculate
and measure speech-based harm. In other words, my sole concern
is how courts determine what they should plug into the harm side
of the equation in undertaking First Amendment analysis. It may
be, of course, that even when certain speech is deemed to cause
significant social harm, the value of that speech is so high that we
are willing to pay that price; for example, in the scenario set forth
above, regulation might not be justified even if the speech will cause
substantial harm to the audience because it is high-value political
advocacy. I am interested here only in the theoretical question of
how courts should calculate, through audience analysis, the harms
that should be imputed to the speech in question.137
Second, when I refer generally to a “normative” approach versus
a “predictive” approach to audience analysis, I am not referring to
two absolutely distinct modes of analysis. As a practical matter,
what one might predict to be the audience’s likely response to
particular speech is often premised on how one thinks an idealized,
137. I thus also leave to the side any issues regarding the appropriate structure of
government regulation. For example, a regulation targeting speech that causes significant
social harm may nevertheless be struck down because it discriminates based on viewpoint.
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992).
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hypothetical audience will process the speech, and vice-versa.
Furthermore, as I discuss in more detail below, any form of objective
analysis necessarily includes some normative elements of how a
reasonable audience should act; otherwise, it would simply collapse
into the pure actual-effects test described above.138 I use the terms
“normative” and “predictive” simply to signify two general directions
on a spectrum; courts can undertake audience analyses in a highly
normative manner, in a highly predictive manner, or at any point
in between.
Finally, I am not concerned here with questions regarding the
kinds of social harms that ought to be legitimately subject to
government regulation139—the sorts of normative questions that
often dominate debates surrounding, for example, pornography or
hate speech regulation.140 Rather, my focus is solely on how courts
should conduct audience analyses in calculating harms that are
clearly subject to legitimate government regulation, such as the fear
and intimidation caused by true threats.
With these clarifications out of the way, to what extent should
courts premise audience analysis on a highly normative conception
of an idealized audience, and to what extent should they seek to
forecast the actual harms that will likely be suffered by the
specifically targeted audience?
C. Foreseeability of Actual Harm as the Touchstone of Audience
Analysis
In evaluating how courts ought to conduct First Amendment
audience analysis, it is once again instructive to view the issue
through the lens of tort law. Again, whenever speech is regulated on
the basis of its content, the chain of causation between the speech
and the resulting social harm typically runs through an audience.141
In conducting audience analysis, courts must determine whether the
audience’s processing of the speech effectively breaks the chain of
138. See supra Part III.A.
139. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“[T]he government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”). 
140. See supra note 7.
141. See supra Part I.
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causation—that is, should the harm resulting from the audience’s
processing of the speech be attributed to the speaker? Thus, First
Amendment audience analysis is, in essence, a form of the supersed-
ing or intervening cause analysis that arises frequently in tort law:
both confront the question of whether the subsequent intervention
by another causal force should be sufficient to sever the chain of
causation such that the harm inflicted should not be imputed to the
actor.142
How, then, does tort law approach the issue of intervening
cause? Traditional tort principles identify foreseeability as the
touchstone of intervening cause analysis: whether a subsequent
cause breaks the chain of causation between an allegedly tortious
action and a resulting harm is premised on the ex ante
foreseeability of that cause.143 As one treatise puts it, “Foreseeable
intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk, and
hence of the defendant’s negligence.”144 This principle extends to
situations in which the foreseeable intervening cause involves third
party negligence, intentional wrongdoing, or even criminal action.145
And since tort law generally takes actors’ knowledge of specific
relevant circumstances into account,146 even harm caused by highly
idiosyncratic intervening causes may be imputed to an actor,
provided that he knew or should have known that the intervening
cause could foreseeably result from his actions.147
142. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 440, 441 (1965).
143. See, e.g., Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 773 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009)
(noting that under Pennsylvania law “[a] ‘superseding cause’ is an intervening force that is
‘so extraordinary as not to have been reasonably foreseeable’” (quoting Chacko v.
Commonwealth Dep’t of Transp., 611 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Pa. 1992))); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 442A (“Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the
foreseeable risk of harm through the intervention of another force, and is a substantial factor
in causing the harm, such intervention is not a superseding cause.”); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 56, § 44, at 302 (“It is therefore said that the defendant is to be held liable if, but only if,
the intervening cause is ‘foreseeable.’”). 
144. KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, § 44, at 303.
145. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 447, 448; KEETON ET AL., supra note 56,
§ 44, at 304-05. 
146. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, § 32, at 185 (“[I]f a person in fact has knowledge,
skill, or even intelligence superior to that of the ordinary person, the law will demand of that
person conduct consistent with it.”).
147. See David A. Anderson, Incitement and Tort Law, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 957, 979
(2002) (“As far as legal cause is concerned, tort law does not distinguish sharply between risks
that the defendant actually appreciated and risks that it should have appreciated but did not.
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This longstanding tort principle makes both practical and
normative sense. The fundamental goal of tort law is often conceptu-
alized as maintaining the appropriate social balance between
people’s freedom to act and people’s interest in personal security.148
In premising liability on the foreseeability of intervening causes and
their associated harms, tort law makes the sensible judgment—one
that accords with basic notions of fairness—that actors ought to
bear responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of their actions,
even if those consequences may be highly idiosyncratic or the
product of third party negligence or criminality.
The same rationale fits the First Amendment context, in which
courts are similarly tasked with maintaining the appropriate social
balance between the far-reaching value of unfettered speech and the
potential harms that can result from such speech. Tort principles
thus suggest a generally predictive approach to First Amendment
audience analysis. If foreseeability is the touchstone of such
analysis, then courts should be concerned with determining the
reasonable likelihood that the targeted audience will actually
process the speech in a harmful manner, rather than hypothesizing
how an idealized rational audience should process the speech.
Professor Lyrissa Lidsky, however, has suggested that courts
ought to adopt a broadly normative approach in undertaking
audience analysis.149 In her view, it is an “article[ ] of faith in
modern First Amendment theory” that “audiences are capable of
rationally evaluating the truth, quality, credibility, and usefulness
of core speech.”150 That is, the audience is generally presumed to be
“rational, skeptical, and capable of sorting through masses of
information to find truth.”151 Lidsky argues that despite significant
theoretical challenges to the “marketplace of ideas” theory and
cognitive psychological studies highlighting people’s propensity to
cling to irrational beliefs, courts ought to adhere to the “rational
audience” assumption.152
It requires only that the risk be foreseeable, not foreseen.”).
148. See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703, 719-20 (1992).
149. See generally Lidsky, supra note 117. 
150. Id. at 810.
151. Id. at 815.
152. Id. at 835-49.
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Lidsky’s “rational audience” argument is pitched at a broad
theoretical level and is, on its face, limited only to “core” speech.153
Her argument suggests, however, that as a general matter, the
proper approach to conducting audience analysis is to presume a
“savvy and sophisticated” audience154—one that is non-impulsive,
thick-skinned, and generally resistant to processing speech in
harmful ways. Lidsky argues against adopting “[a] presumption of
audience irrationality”155—a general assumption that audiences are
apt to process speech in a harmful manner—and against approaches
that would attempt to predict the actual effects of speech on a
targeted audience, arguing, among other things, that such ap-
proaches risk “dumbing down”156 public discourse and affording the
government opportunities to interfere with the marketplace of
ideas.157
I certainly agree with Lidsky’s position in part. Much of the
philosophical underpinnings of modern First Amendment jurispru-
dence are premised on the assumption that people generally process
speech in a rational manner. Take, for instance, the “marketplace
of ideas” metaphor famously set forth by Justice Holmes, who stated
that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas,” and that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”158 This “pursuit
of truth” rationale for protecting speech—which has gone on to play
a prominent role within the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
rhetoric159—necessarily assumes that public discourse occurs in a
rational, honest, and fair manner such that the truth will ultimately
emerge from an open clash of conflicting ideas.160
153. See id. at 802-04. Lidsky has discussed, in a previous article, the benefits of taking
actual audience reactions to speech into account in evaluating defamation claims. See Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1, 49
(1996) (“Requiring plaintiffs to bring evidence that their reputations were actually harmed
in the eyes of actual communities will give the defamatoriness inquiry a more objective
grounding.”).
154. Lidsky, supra note 117, at 810.
155. Id. at 849.
156. Id. at 842.
157. Id. at 841-42.
158. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
159. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980).
160. See SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 30; David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First
Amendment’s Protection of Self-Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 90 (2012); Robert Post,
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But the mere fact that the broad philosophical underpinnings
of much of our First Amendment jurisprudence assume a rational
audience does not necessarily mean that courts should calculate
the harm resulting from speech based on an idealized rational
audience construct. As I noted above, as a purely descriptive matter,
First Amendment doctrine can be conceptualized at its core as a
balancing analysis.161 In crafting speech categories, assembling
scrutiny tests, and the like, the Supreme Court has generally sought
to determine when the far-reaching value of speech outweighs the
often more immediate harms caused by the speech, and to calibrate
the scope of First Amendment protection accordingly.162 The
overarching rational audience assumption adopted by Holmes and
Brandeis at the inception of modern First Amendment jurispru-
dence recognizes the tremendous value that certain speech, such as
political advocacy, has in uncovering and ascertaining truth. It also
might serve to dictate, in general terms, what types of harms ought
to be recognized as colorable speech harms.163 But once certain
social harms are identified as legitimate subjects of government
regulation, the rational audience assumption does not necessarily
lead to the premise that courts should measure those harms only
insofar as an idealized hypothetical audience would suffer them.
I do agree that First Amendment audience analysis should not
be geared towards the “least sophisticated audience.”164 As described
above, the mere fact that someone might process the speech in a
harmful manner should not, by itself, require that the harm in
question be imputed to the speech.165 But if First Amendment
doctrine, at its most basic level, seeks to identify the optimal
balance between the value and harms of uninhibited speech, then
courts’ ultimate goal should be to forecast, as accurately as possible,
Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 478 (2011); see also Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
161. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
162. Of course, as I noted above, this is an oversimplification; other concerns, such as
chilling effects or the particular means by which the government chooses to regulate speech,
come into play as well. See supra notes 15, 18 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text (distinguishing audience analysis
from these sorts of purely normative questions).
164. Lidsky, supra note 117, at 838. 
165. See supra Part III.A (discussing the shortcomings of actual-effects tests in light of
the “idiosyncratic audience” problem).
2014] FIRST AMENDMENT AUDIENCE ANALYSIS 1687
the extent to which the speech in question would actually be
processed by the targeted audience in a harmful manner.
Again, this sort of predictive and context-sensitive approach to
audience analysis naturally follows from the parallel tort doctrine
of intervening cause.166 But it is also rooted in the fundamental
premises of modern First Amendment jurisprudence. In seeking to
properly tailor the scope of First Amendment protection, courts
should weigh the value of speech against the harm that will
foreseeably result from the actual audience’s processing of such
speech, not against some idealized notion of how a rational audience
should process the speech.
If courts instead were to adopt a highly idealized rational
audience standard in conducting audience analysis, then a number
of very real social harms would simply be ignored. For example, in
the Skokie-inspired example above,167 if it is clear that the speech
will foreseeably cause legitimately regulable harm to the
audience—even if that harm may be idiosyncratic to that particular
audience—then it is not clear why a court should not be entitled to
take that social harm into account in determining the appropriate
scope of First Amendment protection. Just as much as a strong
irrational audience assumption, a strong rational audience assump-
tion would skew courts’ ability to maintain the appropriate balance
between speech value and harm that rests at the center of First
Amendment doctrine.
D. Potential Critiques of a Predictive Approach to Audience
Analysis
In arguing that courts generally ought to adopt a rational audi-
ence assumption, Lidsky suggests that such an assumption produces
independent benefits that would presumably justify courts’ depar-
ture from pure accuracy and calibration concerns. She argues,
among other things, that such an assumption would guard against
the “dumbing down” of public discourse, that it would exhort
citizens to conform to appropriate social standards, and that it
would protect against government interference with the marketplace
166. See supra text accompanying notes 141-47.
167. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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of ideas—benefits that would not accrue under either an “irrational
audience” or “actual audience” assumption. I address each of these
arguments in turn.
1. Preventing the “Dumbing Down” of Public Discourse
Lidsky suggests that failing to adopt a “rational audience”
standard would “dumb down” the public discourse because speakers
would have to be sensitive to “unsophisticated audience members
who will not understand the nuances of their speech.”168 She argues
that “[s]peakers would be responsible for transgressing the bound-
aries of public discourse unless they correctly predicted the
interpretation that might be placed on their speech by unsophisti-
cated audience members.”169 But in cases where the targeted
audience will reasonably and foreseeably process the speech in
question in a socially harmful manner—and that harm is something
the government can legitimately seek to prevent—speakers should
take this harm into account.
Take, for example, the basic facts of Greenbelt Cooperative Pub-
lishing Association v. Bresler.170 Bresler, a real estate developer, won
a libel verdict against a newspaper that had used the word “black-
mail” to describe his negotiating position with the city council.171
The Court found that “even the most careless reader must have per-
ceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole.”172 Giv-
en the actual language of the article,173 I would tend to agree with
the Court’s assessment, and the Court noted that the record was
“completely devoid of evidence that anyone in the city of Greenbelt
or anywhere else thought Bresler had been charged with a crime.”174
But now let us imagine that the article was an editorial that said
the following: “The town should not give in to Mr. Bresler’s
extortionate demands, which are tantamount to blackmail.”175 A
168. Lidsky, supra note 117, at 841-42.
169. Id. at 841.
170. 398 U.S. 6, 7-9, 15 (1970).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 14.
173. See id. at 15-18.
174. See id. at 14.
175. The Supreme Court has made clear that in the defamation context, there is no
categorical constitutional immunity for statements of opinion. If any “statement on matters
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“rational” reader would probably read this language as heated
rhetoric. But what if it turns out that anyone familiar with the
newspaper’s readership—including the writer—could easily foresee
that a substantial number of readers would take this to mean that
Bresler had actually committed blackmail? In this case, the speech
causes a real, substantial social harm that the government can
clearly seek to regulate—damage to reputation based on a false
perception. As long as the harm is foreseeable—even if it is not
based on a “rational” interpretation—then it is unclear why we
could not expect the speaker to account for this harm in deciding
how to craft his speech ex ante.176
2. Encouraging Citizens to Conform to Higher Standards
Perhaps only harms that would be suffered by an idealized
rational audience should count because such a standard will serve
to educate listeners who do not meet that standard. Lidsky, for
example, analogizes the function of the “rational audience” in First
Amendment law to the function of the “reasonable person” in tort
law.177 This tort law analogy, however, does not clearly map onto the
First Amendment framework.
The reasonable person standard in negligence law is used to
define the terms of a person’s duty to others; a person must act the
way an idealized reasonable person would act, or suffer liability.178
The educative function of tort law rests on the notion that a person
with poor judgment will, as a result of being subject to liability
under a negligence regime, learn to adhere to prevailing social
standards of care. Put simply, the reasonable person standard
incentivizes people to act in socially desirable ways.179
of public concern” contains a “provably false factual connotation,” then the speaker may be
liable for libel. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990).
176. Of course, if Bresler were deemed to be a public figure—a subject on which the Court
declined to rule in Greenbelt, 398 U.S. at 9—he would have to prove that the reporter made
the defamatory statement with “actual malice.” See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964).
177. Lidsky, supra note 117, at 842-44.
178. KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, § 32, at 173-75.
179. See, e.g., id. at 176-77; Wendy J. Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-
Benefit Distinction, 122 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 62, 63 n.4 (2009) (“Negligence seeks to
internalize harms and incentivize defendants away from undesirable behavior.”).
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As discussed above, however, speech causation is complex, and
many harms resulting from speech are not actually incurred by the
listeners of such speech. For example, in cases of reactive harm,
listeners might process the speech in a way that causes them to
commit harmful acts against third parties, as in incitement cases or
“media harm” cases.180 Or in circumstances that involve
dissemination-based harm, like defamation, third parties might
suffer harm based on the audience’s interpretation of the speech in
question. In these cases, adhering to a rational audience standard
will not lead the audience to “come up to the standard of the
reasonable person”181 because it is third parties, not the audience,
who will suffer uncompensated harm.
Furthermore, even in cases in which the audience suffers direct
harm as a result of its “irrational” processing of speech, the logic of
the reasonable person standard in tort law does not necessarily fit
the First Amendment context. It makes intuitive sense to say that
an absent-minded driver will, if he is able, learn to take greater
precautions if he is forced to pay for property damage he has
negligently caused. But it makes less intuitive sense to say that if
the law did not provide the Holocaust survivors in the above
example182 with vindication for the foreseeable fear they felt, they
would simply develop a thicker skin to extremist rhetoric in the
future. Although a highly idealized rational audience assumption
might force listeners to confront more potentially hurtful speech on
a daily basis, it is unclear whether this would incentivize them to
develop a thicker skin as a result—they may simply suffer increased
harm.183 And to the extent that the harm is reasonably foreseeable
(and one that the government may legitimately seek to regulate), it
is not immediately obvious why we should automatically insist that
listeners bear such harm without legal recourse.
180. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
181. Lidsky, supra note 117, at 842. 
182. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
183. Indeed, the audience in First Amendment direct-harm analysis may be more
comparable to the plaintiff in the tort context, and tort law broadly recognizes harms caused
by plaintiffs’ special sensitivities. The most obvious example of this is the “thin-skull” rule,
which generally holds that in calculating tort liability, “the defendant takes his victim as he
finds him.” RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
472 (10th ed. 2012). 
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3. Preventing Government Agenda-Setting
Perhaps a rational audience assumption is a necessary antidote
to potential government interference with the marketplace of ideas.
Lidsky argues that “[i]f courts were free to indulge the assumption
that the public is generally stupid and uninformed,” this assumption
would open the door for the government to manipulate public
discourse in the name of the “public good.”184 Again, I certainly
agree that courts should not assume that the public is generally
stupid and uninformed, and such an assumption might indeed risk
excessive government interference with public discourse. But when
speech foreseeably causes harms that outweigh the value of the
speech, the government is justified in interfering with the market-
place of ideas. When speech will foreseeably lead to imminent
violent acts, or cause listeners to feel actually threatened, or cause
people’s reputations to be actually damaged, it should not mat-
ter—at least as a question of calculating the harm attributable to
the speaker—whether that harm might emerge in a manner that
appears “irrational” in some abstract sense.
Lidsky suggests the early Espionage Act cases as examples of
the dangers inherent in rejecting a strong rational audience
assumption.185 But as Lidsky observes, the Court in those cases
undertook a highly deferential approach in scrutinizing the govern-
ment’s judgment of how audiences would process the regulated
speech.186 For example, in Frohwerk, the Court upheld Frohwerk’s
conviction under the Espionage Act with little to no scrutiny
regarding the likelihood of actual harm.187 I certainly agree that we
ought to be inherently suspicious of the government when it seeks
to regulate speech and that the Court should have done more to
scrutinize the government regulation. But courts should address
such suspicions by carefully double-checking the government’s math
on both the speech value and social harm sides of the equation. And
if we care about accurately calculating the value and harms of
speech in delineating First Amendment protection, the harm side of
the equation should be premised on predictive concerns: how likely
184. Lidsky, supra note 117, at 844.
185. See id. at 845.
186. See id.
187. See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919).
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and foreseeable it is that the targeted audience will process the
speech in a harmful manner.
E. Summary
Thus, courts should generally frame and undertake audience
analysis as a matter of fact-based, predictive judgment—how the
audience in question will likely process the speech—rather than as
a normative judgment of how a hypothetical rational audience
should process the speech. Of course, as I noted above, selecting this
basic mode of analysis only points in a general direction that courts
ought to travel along a spectrum of approaches. Within the set of
highly contextual speech categorization cases like Fulmer, each case
will present its own series of difficult, highly fact-intensive issues to
resolve.
For example, what sorts of contextual factors should the court
take into account in forecasting how the audience will likely process
particular speech? If accurate prediction is the proper mode of
analysis, then courts should delve deeply into context, taking into
account the setting of the speech, the relationship between the
speaker and the listener, and so forth. But there must be a stopping
point in adopting contextual factors; if courts incorporated every
single contextual factor related to the audience, the speaker, and the
speech, the analysis would collapse into an actual-effects test. This
scenario would be the equivalent of the Fulmer court conducting its
audience analysis based on a “reasonable Egan” test, taking into
account every single aspect of Egan’s personality—and of course, if
Egan actually felt threatened, then a reasonable person with all of
his characteristics would obviously feel the same way.
Thus, within the Fulmer paradigm of audience analysis, courts
must determine which contextual factors are relevant and which
ought to be disregarded. In making these choices, some element of
normative judgment must inevitably enter; for example, in certain
circumstances, a court might choose to take the listener’s social
background into account, while it might choose to exclude this factor
in other circumstances. Again, any sort of predictive analysis must
incorporate some normative backstop lest it collapse into a simple
actual-effects test. My sole contention here is that courts should
generally frame their analyses towards the goal of accurately
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forecasting how the audience will foreseeably respond, not towards
an assessment of how an idealized audience should act. Given the
fact-specific complexities of this type of audience analysis, it is
difficult to generalize beyond this broad principle.188
F. Predictive Approaches in Generalized, Scrutiny-Stage Audience
Analysis
In this discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of First
Amendment audience analysis, I have focused exclusively on one
particular paradigm of such analysis: the ex post categorization of
particular speech as either low-value speech subject to broad
government regulation or highly protected core speech.189 This is
because this paradigm of audience analysis—given the particular
context within which it occurs—tends to involve a more complex set
of issues and thus affords greater opportunities to explore in depth
the sorts of theoretical concerns that courts might take into account
in undertaking such analysis.
But the same principles apply equally to the other paradigm of
First Amendment audience analysis: the more generalized, open-
ended analysis that occurs at the scrutiny stage, such as the Court’s
analysis in Edenfield. Regardless of the context in which audience
analysis occurs, courts’ overall goal should be to ensure that the
scope of First Amendment protection is correctly calibrated based on
the value and harms of speech. Thus, courts’ primary focus in
undertaking any sort of audience analysis should be to predict, as
accurately as possible, the extent to which the audience will fore-
seeably process the speech in a harmful manner.
Indeed, in the more generalized Edenfield paradigm of audience
analysis, this basic principle is far more self-evident. Within the
Fulmer paradigm, audience analysis is used to categorize particular
speech that falls within the hazy borders between protected and
188. For an interesting discussion of exactly how complicated and fact-intensive such
determinations can get, see Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern
First Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1338-39 (2006) (“[T]he threats exception’s
irregular applications, and its adaptability to new forms, are unavoidable.... [because] it is
hard to force a sharply defined doctrinal grid on a zone of human behavior that is, almost by
definition, disorderly.”).
189. See supra Part II.A.
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low-value speech. As a result, courts must not only undertake a
highly fact-intensive analysis, but they must also be sensitive to the
idiosyncratic audience problem, which implicates general fairness
concerns and can lead to chilling effects on speakers.190 As I noted
above, this explains why courts avoid pure actual-effects tests in
conducting these sorts of audience analyses.191
But in cases like Edenfield, the government has already “frozen”
a clearly delineated subset of speech.192 Thus, courts need not worry
about any idiosyncratic audience issues; there are no case-specific
facts to work through, nor are there any direct chilling concerns in
play. The court’s job is simply to scrutinize the government’s ex ante
harm calculus in regulating speech, which calls for the court to
forecast the actual likelihood that the targeted audience will process
the regulated speech in a harmful manner.193
The more abstract and generalized posture of cases like
Edenfield thus greatly simplifies the contours of courts’ audience
analyses. Rather than looking at a particular instance of speech,
courts must evaluate a designated subset of speech, and rather than
dealing with a particular contextualized audience, courts must look
to the general target audience designated by the regulation in
question. In this context, the analysis tends to take on a far more
empirical bent, and courts naturally focus more directly on ques-
tions of pure prediction: to what extent will the audience process
this particular subset of speech in a manner that actually produces
the social harm that the government seeks to regulate?194
190. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
191. See supra Part III.A. Along with adopting objective tests, courts might choose to
address these sorts of chilling and fairness concerns by adding a subjective intent element to
constitutional definitions of low-value speech. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973)
(“[S]ince there was no evidence, or rational inference from the import of the language, that
his words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder, those words
could not be punished by the State on the ground that they had a tendency to lead to
violence.”); Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1633 (2013).
192. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768-70 (1993).
193. See id. at 770-71.
194. See id.
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IV. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF ADOPTING A PREDICTIVE APPROACH TO
AUDIENCE ANALYSIS
If, as I argue, the goal of audience analysis is to forecast, as
accurately as possible, the harms that will likely result from the
targeted audience’s processing of speech, what ramifications should
this have on the ways in which courts currently conduct audience
analysis? In this Part, I propose that courts, in delineating tests for
low-value speech, ought to frame audience analyses in clearly
predictive terms rather than in terms that might invite a highly
normative approach; I suggest the reasonable speaker framework
adopted by some courts in the true threats context as a sensible
model. Furthermore, in the context of more generalized scrutiny
analyses, I observe that the Supreme Court’s apparently increasing
solicitude for considering empirical and social science data in
conducting audience analysis represents a step in the right direc-
tion, and I argue that courts should generally err on the side of
empirical rigor rather than intuitive judgment in undertaking such
analyses.
A. Adopting a “Reasonable Speaker” Framework in Ex Post Speech
Categorization Cases
How should courts conduct audience analysis in ex post speech
categorization cases like Fulmer? As I discussed above, in order to
accurately calibrate the scope of First Amendment protection, such
analysis should be predictive in nature, premised on how the
targeted audience will foreseeably process the speech rather than on
how an idealized rational audience should process the speech.195 But
a pure actual effects-test, even in those circumstances in which it
can feasibly be applied, is not a viable option due to both fairness
and chilling concerns.196
Thus, courts must apply some form of objective test to measure
the harm resulting from particular speech. But there are different
ways in which courts can frame such tests, and this variety is
195. See supra Part III.C.
196. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
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evident in the formulations that courts have adopted in crafting the
various tests for low-value speech. For example, in the area of true
threats—in which the Supreme Court has yet to establish a clear
standard197—some courts have adopted a reasonable audience test,
wherein speech is deemed a low-value threat if “an ordinary,
reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the [speech]
would interpret it as a threat of injury.”198 Other courts, like the
First Circuit in Fulmer, have adopted a reasonable speaker test,
which rests on whether the speaker “should have reasonably
foreseen that the statement he uttered would be taken as a threat
by those to whom it is made.”199
In the incitement context, the Brandenburg Court framed its
audience analysis simply around whether the speech “is likely to
incite or produce” imminent lawless action.200 In Cohen, the Court
defined “fighting words” as “those personally abusive epithets
which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of
common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.”201
And defamation by implication cases have produced a variety of
formulations;202 for example, whether “the statements could fairly
be read to libel the plaintiff,”203 or whether the words convey defam-
atory meaning when “construed in the plain and popular sense in
which the rest of the world would naturally understand them,”204 or
whether defamatory meaning can be gleaned “ ‘according to the fair
197. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
198. United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973); see also United States
v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Maisonet, 484 F.2d at 1358); United States v.
Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990).
199. United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997); see also United States
v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002).
200. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
201. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
202. Although these formulations usually arise in the context of determining whether the
law of a particular state recognizes a claim for defamation by implication, these standards
also likely abut against constitutional standards, as there is presumably some constitutional
limit as to how broadly states can define actionable defamation by implication. A similar
dynamic can be seen in the true threats context, in which standards originally formulated in
the context of statutory interpretation have gradually evolved into constitutional standards
for defining unprotected true threats. See Crane, supra note 96, at 1245. 
203. Loeb v. New Times Commc’ns Corp., 497 F. Supp. 85, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
204. Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 416 F.3d 320, 331 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Schnupp v. Smith,
457 S.E.2d 42, 46 (Va. 1995)).
2014] FIRST AMENDMENT AUDIENCE ANALYSIS 1697
and natural meaning which will be given [the statement] by
reasonable persons of ordinary intelligence.’ ”205
The extent to which there is any meaningful difference in the
actual operation of these standards is unclear. The Supreme Court
has done little to clarify the general incitement and fighting words
standards it has established, and lower courts do not usually offer
much of a gloss on these general standards. In many cases, the
audience analysis inquiry is simply sent to the jury,206 and whether
a jury might apply, say, a reasonable audience test any differently
from Brandenburg’s “likely to incite” standard is unclear. But if the
goal of audience analysis is accurate forecasting of the harms that
will foreseeably result from particular speech, then courts’ doctrinal
formulations of low-value speech categories should clearly reflect
this goal. At the same time, however, such formulations should
reflect general fairness concerns as to when speakers should be
responsible for idiosyncratic audience responses, and they should
limit any excessive chilling of valuable speech.
The reasonable speaker test adopted by multiple courts in the
true threats context seems to provide the most sensible balance of
all of these concerns. Under this standard, a court should measure
the social harm resulting from the audience’s processing of particu-
lar speech based on what the speaker should have reasonably
foreseen under the circumstances; that is, whether he should have
reasonably predicted that the audience to whom the statement was
made would process the statement in a harm-producing manner.
205. Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1988) (quoting Herrmann v. Newark
Morning Ledger Co., 138 A.2d 61, 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952)).
206. Defamation by implication cases are an exception; in those cases, courts must initially
decide, as a matter of law, whether the language in question is reasonably susceptible to a
defamatory meaning. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 614 (1977) (“The court
determines (a) whether a communication is capable of bearing a particular meaning, and (b)
whether that meaning is defamatory.”). It also bears noting that in First Amendment cases,
the Supreme Court has generally established that appellate courts must “make an
independent examination of the whole record in order to make sure that the judgment does
not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression,” Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
284-86 (1964) (internal quotation marks omitted)), although in many contexts the specific
boundaries of independent appellate review have not been clearly defined. See, e.g., Bryan
Adamson, Critical Error: Courts’ Refusal to Recognize Intentional Race Discrimination
Findings as Constitutional Facts, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 41 (2009) (noting the “confusion
as to which elements of libel ... would, as a constitutional imperative, demand ‘independent
assessment’” under Bose). 
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This test, in essence, mirrors the parallel tort law doctrine of
intervening cause that I discussed above.207
The reasonable speaker approach explicitly pushes audience
analysis toward prediction and foreseeability, designating the actual
audience, rather than a hypothetical audience, as the relevant
baseline. It encourages decisionmakers to undertake highly
contextualized analyses, tailored to the particular facts of the case
at hand, in an effort to ascertain how the targeted audience would
foreseeably process the speech. By contrast, a more open-ended
standard based on an “ordinary, reasonable audience” or an “ordi-
nary citizen” would open the door for the decisionmaker to base its
audience analysis on a strong normative judgment of how a
hypothetical, idealized listener should process the speech. Again, if
courts are to accurately calibrate the scope of First Amendment
protection, then audience analyses should reflect the social harms
that will foreseeably result from the actual audience’s processing of
the particular speech in question, rather than the harms that
should result if an idealized rational audience were to process the
speech.208
At the same time, the reasonable speaker framework, by
calculating speech-based harms based on what the speaker should
have reasonably foreseen, significantly mitigates the chilling and
fairness concerns associated with premising speaker liability on
idiosyncratic audience responses to speech. As noted above, most
would deem it unfair to impute to the speaker all possible idiosyn-
cratic audience responses to his speech—for example, the speaker
whose lecture on healthy eating causes an unhinged listener to
torch a nearby fast-food restaurant.209 But what if the lecturer
happened to know that this particular person was in the audience
and could reasonably foresee that torching the restaurant was likely
to occur as a result? At this point, any fairness concerns would be
greatly diminished; allocating the resulting social harm to the
speech would seem far more sensible when such harm could be
reasonably predicted ex ante. In other words, it is not simply the
idiosyncratic nature of an audience’s response that triggers this
207. See supra text accompanying notes 141-48.
208. See supra Part III.C.
209. See supra Part III.A.
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fairness concern—rather, it is the concern that the speaker could
not reasonably predict such a response ex ante that makes it seem
unfair.
Furthermore, the reasonable speaker framework mitigates any
widespread chilling of valuable speech. The speaker need not worry
about harm-inducing, idiosyncratic audience responses to his speech
unless he reasonably should have predicted such a response ex ante.
This could be either because he had specific knowledge of these
idiosyncrasies or because they were so readily apparent that it is
reasonable to impute such knowledge to him.
Of course, some degree of chilling will necessarily remain under
a reasonable speaker framework. A speaker may be uncertain as to
what will be deemed reasonable for him to foresee, and there is
always a risk that courts will make mistakes. But to the extent
courts remain concerned about these residual chilling effects, there
are external means they can undertake to mitigate them. For
example, they might choose to adopt a specific intent require-
ment—that is, a requirement that the speaker intend that the
speech produce the harmful result in question210—or they might
limit the application of the analysis to a particular subset of speech
that is clearly defined in purely content-based terms.211 The only
point that I wish to make here is that when courts seek to measure
the social harm associated with particular speech, the standard they
use to measure the harms that count in this calculus should focus
on what the speaker should reasonably be able to predict in light of
the overall factual context, including the characteristics of the
actual targeted audience. As long as the harms in question are
reasonably foreseeable to the speaker, they should be relevant to the
court’s overall calculus, even if they might ultimately be outweighed
by the value of the speech or other factors.
210. See Kendrick, supra note 191, at 1658-59 (describing the Supreme Court’s use of
specific-intent requirements).
211. For example, the Brandenburg standard, which Gerald Gunther famously called the
“most speech-protective standard yet evolved by the Supreme Court,” Gerald Gunther,
Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of
History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 755 (1975), has been construed to require both subjective intent
and direct words of incitement on top of its “likely to incite” requirement. See, e.g., Steven G.
Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm and Other First Amendments, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 971,
977-78 (2010).
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B. Embracing Empirical Rigor in Undertaking Scrutiny-Stage
Audience Analyses
As noted above, within the more generalized and abstract
Edenfield paradigm of audience analysis, courts have naturally
tended to focus their analyses on purely predictive concerns.212
Audience analysis in this context invariably takes on a far more
empirical bent, geared specifically towards checking the govern-
ment’s ex ante calculus regarding the extent of harms actually
produced by the subset of protected speech it seeks to regulate.
Thus, the tenor of this more generalized paradigm of audience
analysis tends to accord neatly with the overarching goal of all such
analyses: accurately forecasting the harms likely to result from the
targeted audience’s processing of the speech.
But courts can take different approaches in undertaking this
form of audience analysis. They might simply defer to legislative
judgment in evaluating the causal link between the regulated
speech and the government’s asserted regulatory interest. They
might rely on their own common sense intuitions of how audiences
process speech in accepting or rejecting the government’s assertions.
Or they might require the government to produce empirical
evidence to support its assertions and undertake a rigorous review
of such material. In this Section, I discuss these different ap-
proaches, ultimately concluding that courts should err on the side
of empirical rigor in conducting generalized, scrutiny-stage audience
analyses.
1. Deference, Intuition, and Empirical Evidence
In conducting audience analysis within the more generalized
Edenfield paradigm, the Supreme Court has at times afforded a
significant degree of deference to legislative judgments. For
example, in Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,
the Court evaluated a Puerto Rican law prohibiting casinos from
advertising their facilities to the Puerto Rican public.213 The
government asserted that its regulatory interest “in the health,
212. See supra text accompanying notes 193-194.
213. 478 U.S. 328, 330 (1986).
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safety, and welfare of its citizens” would be advanced by reducing
the demand for casino gambling by Puerto Rican residents.214 In
applying the third prong of the Central Hudson test to the
regulation—“whether the challenged restrictions ... ‘directly ad-
vance’ the government’s asserted interest”215—the Court deemed the
legislature’s “reasonable belief” that the advertising would increase
demand, along with the mere fact that the plaintiff casino operator
chose to litigate the case, sufficient to establish the required causal
connection between the regulated speech and the harm asserted by
the government.216
The Court’s analysis in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation followed a
similar pattern.217 In Pacifica, the Court upheld the FCC’s censure
of a radio broadcaster for broadcasting George Carlin’s profanity-
filled “Filthy Words” monologue.218 The Court found that the FCC’s
restriction on profanity advanced the government’s interest in
protecting the well-being of children, stating that “Pacifica’s broad-
cast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant,”219 and
that the government’s interest in the “ ‘well-being of its youth’ and
in supporting ‘parents’ claim to authority in their own household’
justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression.”220 The
Court found that “[t]he ease with which children may obtain access
to broadcast material ... amply justif[ies] special treatment of
indecent broadcasting.”221
The Court adopted a highly deferential approach to audience
analysis in both Posadas and Pacifica. In Posadas, it did not
scrutinize the government’s factual assertion that advertising casino
gambling would increase demand; similarly, in Pacifica, it did not
scrutinize the government’s factual assertion that exposure to
profanity negatively affected the well-being of children. The Court’s
lack of discussion of these issues suggests that this deference may
214. Id. at 341.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 341-42. Indeed, the Court went so far as to leave it “up to the legislature to
decide whether or not ... a ‘counterspeech’ policy would be as effective in reducing the demand
for casino gambling as a restriction on advertising.” Id. at 344.
217. 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978).
218. Id. at 760-61.
219. Id. at 749.
220. Id. at 749 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)).
221. Id. at 750.
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have been rooted in the Court’s general intuition as to how the
speech in each case would affect the targeted audience; it likely
found these causal connections sufficiently obvious on their face as
to speak for themselves.
Although one might attribute the Court’s highly deferential and
intuition-based approach in both Posadas and Pacifica to its appli-
cation of intermediate scrutiny,222 the Supreme Court has, in recent
years, increasingly held the government to a more rigorous
evidentiary standard in establishing the causal link between the
regulated speech and the state’s asserted regulatory interest,
particularly in the context of applying intermediate scrutiny to com-
mercial speech regulations.223 Thus, for example, the Edenfield
Court, in evaluating the asserted link between in-person
solicitations by accountants and an increased likelihood of fraud,
noted that the state’s burden “is not satisfied by mere speculation or
conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restric-
tion on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it
recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to
a material degree.”224 In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Court
rejected the government’s “anecdotal evidence and educated
guesses” that a ban on the display of alcohol content on beer labels
suppressed the potential for harmful “strength wars” between beer
manufacturers, stating that the government failed to “offer any
convincing evidence that the labeling ban has inhibited strength
wars.”225 And in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, a plurality of the
Court declined to credit the government’s assertion that a ban on
advertising alcohol prices would “significantly advance the State’s
222. As noted above, Posadas involved a commercial speech regulation, which the Court
evaluated under the intermediate scrutiny framework set forth in Central Hudson. Posadas
de P.R. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 340-42 (1986). And in Pacifica, the Court
appeared to apply a form of intermediate scrutiny premised on the “uniquely pervasive”
nature of broadcast speech compared to printed media. 438 U.S. at 748 (“[O]f all forms of
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection.... [given its] uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.”).
223. See Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Free Speech, Fleeting Expletives, and the
Causation Quagmire: Was Justice Scalia Wrong in Fox Television Stations?, 47 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 737, 762 (2010) (observing that in commercial speech cases, “courts increasingly are
demanding empirical evidence of some sort related to causation and remedy of harm, rather
than impressionistic guesswork or mere speculation and conjecture”).
224. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993).
225. 514 U.S. 476, 490 (1995).
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interest in promoting temperance,” noting that “the State has
presented no evidence to suggest that its speech prohibition will
significantly reduce marketwide consumption.”226
Despite this general trend, however, the Court has remained
somewhat inconsistent in dictating the extent to which it will
demand and rely on empirical evidence in conducting audience
analysis and the extent to which general intuition and common
sense might be sufficient. Indeed, in Burson v. Freeman—a case
invoking strict scrutiny—a plurality of the Court indicated that
mere intuition and “common sense” could be a sufficient basis for
crediting the government’s asserted connection between the speech
and harm.227 In Burson, a four-Justice plurality upheld, under strict
scrutiny, a Tennessee law banning campaign-related speech within
100 feet of polling places.228 In evaluating the connection between
the regulated speech and the state’s asserted interest in preserving
the integrity of the electoral process, the plurality observed simply
that “[a] long history, a substantial consensus, and simple common
sense show that some restricted zone around polling places is
necessary to protect that fundamental right.”229 Later, in Florida
Bar v. Went for It, Inc., the Court cited this language in Burson
approvingly, concluding, over a four-Justice dissent, that empirical
evidence submitted by the government need not adhere to rigorous
statistical and methodological standards.230
If the focus of audience analysis within the Edenfield context is
to double-check the government’s estimation of the harm likely to
result from the regulated speech, then some meaningful degree of
judicial scrutiny should clearly apply. As a doctrinal matter, the
government, within the context of both intermediate and strict
scrutiny, shoulders the burden of both asserting its regulatory
interest and proving a link between that interest and the speech
that it seeks to regulate.231 And although, as a technical matter,
226. 517 U.S. 484, 505-06 (1996) (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted).
227. 504 U.S. 191, 207-08 (1992) (plurality opinion).
228. Id. at 211. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, arguing that the provision should
have been upheld under a less exacting standard of scrutiny. Id. at 214 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
229. Id. at 211.
230. 515 U.S. 618, 628-29 (1995).
231. In reality, how searching a scrutiny analysis the Court actually undertakes can vary.
Compare Posadas de P.R. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341-42 (1986), with 44
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courts generally defer to the government’s judgment when the
speech sought to be regulated falls within one of the low-value
speech categories, even this form of regulation is still in fact subject
to meaningful scrutiny, since as noted above, the initial judgment
as to how that speech should be categorized is necessarily premised
on some form of independent audience analysis conducted by a
judge or jury.232
2. The “Averting Their Eyes” Trope and the Dangers of
Intuition
The extent to which courts should rely on intuitive judgments
and “common sense,” as opposed to empirical evidence, in evaluating
the connection between regulated speech and the government’s
asserted regulatory interest is a thornier issue. If courts’ general
goal in conducting audience analysis is to forecast, as accurately as
possible, the extent to which the audience would actually process
the regulated speech in a harmful manner, then any increased
expectation that empirical evidence should be provided, and any
increased solicitude for undertaking detailed analyses of such data,
would certainly seem to be a positive development. Increased
empirical rigor should, at least in theory, allow courts to predict
speech-based harms more accurately, which would in turn allow
them to better tailor the scope of First Amendment protection.
At the same time, however, empirical rigor comes at the cost of
time and resources, and there are certainly situations in which the
connection between speech and the audience’s likely processing of
the speech is so clear that demanding empirical support for such an
assertion would be unnecessarily burdensome to the government
and wasteful of judicial resources. For example, in Rubin, the Court
observed that “[i]t is assuredly a matter of ‘common sense’ that a
Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505-06 (1996). Within the current landscape of
First Amendment jurisprudence, though, it appears that the highly deferential approaches
undertaken by the Court in Posadas and Pacifica are largely outliers; the Court typically
applies a meaningful degree of judicial scrutiny to content-based regulations of fully or
partially protected speech. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 509-10 (plurality opinion)
(repudiating Posadas).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 97-101 (noting that all categories of low-value
speech are defined, at least in part, by the extent to which they are processed by the audience
in a socially harmful manner).
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restriction on the advertising of a product characteristic will
decrease the extent to which consumers select a product on the basis
of that trait.”233 As a matter of general logic, this appears true on its
face, and it would seem odd and wasteful to require the government
to prove this sort of causal connection by reference to empirical
evidence. Perhaps the government’s assertion in Posadas—that
advertising for a casino will necessarily increase demand—is
similarly intuitive enough on its face to justify no additional em-
pirical support.
But of course, reliance on intuition and common sense also
increases the likelihood that courts will inaccurately forecast the
actual extent to which the regulated speech will produce the social
harm asserted by the government. Although in many cases common
sense determinations translate to a sensible judgment of what the
actual effects of speech on an audience would likely be, they also, by
nature, run the risk of skewing the appropriate calibration of First
Amendment protection, either because courts’ predictions are simply
incorrect or perhaps because of courts’ underlying desire to inject a
largely normative conception of  “appropriate” audience reaction into
what should be a predictive analysis of actual harm.
Take, for example, the common trope, invoked frequently by the
Supreme Court, that speakers confronted with offensive and
potentially hurtful speech can limit the harm caused to them by
simply “averting their eyes.” This trope first emerged in Cohen,
when the Court, in response to the argument that “Cohen’s
distasteful mode of expression was thrust upon unwilling or
unsuspecting viewers,” responded that “[t]hose in the Los Angeles
courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.”234 Observing that the
speech occurred in a public area rather than, say, in the listeners’
home, the Court concluded, “[W]e do not think the fact that some
unwilling ‘listeners’ in a public building may have been briefly
exposed to [the speech] can serve to justify this breach of the peace
conviction.”235
233. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995) (internal citation omitted).
234. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
235. Id. at 22.
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The Cohen Court thus relied on an intuitive, common sense
judgment regarding the audience’s sensitivity to the speech. But it
is not immediately apparent, on its face, whether this judgment is
correct as an empirical matter. Certainly the audience, once
confronted with Cohen’s “Fuck the Draft” jacket, can choose to look
away immediately. But it also seems plausible that most of the
damage is done as soon as the speech is initially absorbed by the
reader—that once the reader has observed the words, he will remain
fixated on them, to his detriment, even if he immediately looks
away. This question presumably has an actual empirical answer; as
Schauer has noted, “the issue ... turns on how much, if at all, the
mind and the memory will retain that which one wishes he had not
seen in the first place.”236 It is not immediately obvious what that
answer is, but the Court was willing to make this generalized
empirical judgment based purely on its own intuition.
The reasons why the Court adopted this intuitive conclusion are
not immediately clear. Perhaps the Court truly believed, as a
predictive matter, that this is in fact empirically correct—that
people could indeed avoid substantial harm from offensive written
speech by looking away. Perhaps the Court was making an indirect
normative judgment as to how people ought to act in a speech-
tolerant society—that even if people will suffer emotional harm from
a short glance at the jacket, they really ought to toughen up and
develop a thicker skin. Or perhaps, as Schauer suggests, it is simply
silly to believe that people experienced very much actual harm as a
result of Cohen’s jacket,237 and the Court was content to adopt the
“avert their eyes” trope simply to dispose of what was essentially a
nonissue. Whatever the underlying rationale, Cohen introduced this
empirical judgment, based on little more than general intuition, into
the Court’s jurisprudence, despite the fact that it might well be a
completely inaccurate estimation of how audiences actually process
speech. Needless to say, if the goal of audience analysis is to
forecast, as accurately as possible, the actual harm that speech will
236. Schauer, supra note 6, at 106; see also id. at 107 (characterizing the issue as “an
empirical psychological question, as to which we might think serious research would be of
some assistance”). 
237. Id. at 94-95 (“[E]ven as far back as 1969 it seems far-fetched to imagine that very
many people suffered very much anguish over their involuntary exposure to the words on Paul
Cohen’s jacket.”).
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likely cause, the Court’s knee-jerk adoption of such a judgment
could substantially hamper the Court’s ability to properly calibrate
the scope of First Amendment protection.
Since Cohen, the Court has trotted out the “avert your eyes”
trope in numerous cases addressing “captive audience” issues, but
it has done so in a largely inconsistent manner. As noted above, in
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, a plurality of the Court upheld
a city ban on posted political advertisements on public transporta-
tion,238 based on its observation that “[u]sers would be subjected to
the blare of political propaganda.”239 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Douglas stated that “the man on the streetcar has no choice but to
sit and listen, or perhaps to sit and to try not to listen.”240 By
contrast, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville—which was decided
just a year after Lehman—the Court, in striking down a local
ordinance prohibiting the showing of films containing nudity at
drive-in theaters,241 stated that “the burden normally falls upon the
viewer to ‘avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by
averting [his] eyes.’ ”242 Similarly, in Consolidated Edison, Inc. v.
Public Service Commission of New York, the Court struck down New
York’s order prohibiting “the inclusion in monthly electric bills of
inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy,”243 stating
that “customers who encounter an objectionable billing insert may
‘effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply
by averting their eyes.’ ”244 The Court noted that “[t]he customer of
Consolidated Edison may escape exposure to objectionable material
simply by transferring the bill insert from envelope to wastebas-
ket.”245
It is difficult to square the different applications of the “avert
your eyes” trope in these cases. Why the principle would apply
any differently to the person who comes upon nudity shown on a
drive-through movie screen or the person who comes across an
insert in his electric bill, compared to the person who sees political
238. 418 U.S. 298, 299, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion).
239. Id. at 304.
240. Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
241. 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975).
242. Id. at 210-11 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
243. 447 U.S. 530, 532 (1980).
244. Id. at 542 (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21).
245. Id.
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propaganda on a train, is unclear. In each case, people presumably
have no notice that they will be confronted with harmful speech, but
once they have processed the speech, they have the ability—if one
accepts the Cohen Court’s assumption—to drastically limit the harm
they suffer by averting their eyes. As the Lehman dissent correctly
pointed out, there is little to distinguish the political advertisements
in that case from the offensive jacket in Cohen; in both cases, the
speech was in written form, and “[s]hould passengers chance to
glance at advertisements they find offensive, they can ‘effectively
avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting
their eyes.’ ”246
A comparison of the Court’s opinion in Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products with its opinion in Florida Bar vividly illustrates this
disconnect. In Bolger, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of a
federal law prohibiting the unsolicited mailing of advertisements for
contraceptives.247 A drug company sought to mail out, among other
things, “informational pamphlets discussing the desirability and
availability of prophylactics in general or [the company’s] products
in particular.”248 After deeming the informational pamphlets
commercial speech, the Court evaluated the regulation under the
Central Hudson standard.249 Noting the government’s asserted
interest in protecting recipients from being exposed to offensive
material within the confines of their home, the Court observed that
“[r]ecipients of objectionable mailings … may ‘effectively avoid
further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their
eyes.’ ”250 The Court thus concluded that the “short, though regular,
journey from mail box to trash can ... is an acceptable burden, at
least so far as the Constitution is concerned,”251 and it struck down
the regulation as a violation of the First Amendment.252
Contrast this with the Court’s analysis in Florida Bar, which
evaluated the Florida Bar’s prohibition of direct-mail attorney
246. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 320 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21)).
247. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 61 (1983).
248. Id. at 62.
249. Id. at 68-69.
250. Id. at 72.
251. Id. (quoting Lamont v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), aff’d, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968)).
252. Id. at 75.
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solicitations to accident victims within thirty days following an
accident or disaster.253 After accepting the government’s asserted
interest in “protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury
victims and their loved ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact
by lawyers,”254 and after describing the results of a two-year study
of lawyer solicitation undertaken by the Bar,255 the Court upheld the
regulation.256 It explicitly distinguished Bolger—and the “avert your
eyes” assumption relied upon in that case—by characterizing the
government’s asserted harm as “a function of simple receipt of
targeted solicitations within days of accidents,” which, according to
the Court, could not be combatted simply by “[t]hrowing the letter
away shortly after opening it.”257
The rationales of Bolger and Florida Bar appear to be com-
pletely at odds with each other. In general terms, the issues were
identical: commercial actors were sending unsolicited direct-mail
advertisements to people at their homes, and these advertisements
contained speech that many would find offensive based on its
content. Yet in Bolger, the Court embraced the Cohen trope,
assuming that offended parties can limit the offense caused by the
speech by throwing the ads away in the trash.258 In Florida Bar, by
contrast, the Court insisted that merely throwing away the
solicitation would be insufficient to prevent the audience from
suffering substantial harm.259 And the Florida Bar Court’s attempt
to distinguish Bolger is not particularly persuasive. Even accepting
the Court’s characterization of the harm in that case as the
detrimental effects that readers’ anger might have on the legal
profession,260 there is no obvious reason why the Cohen principle
would not apply just as easily to that form of harm; readers could
presumably limit any such anger or frustration by immediately
253. See Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620-21 (1995).
254. Id. at 624.
255. Id. at 626-27.
256. Id. at 624-29.
257. Id. at 630-31.
258. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983).
259. Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 631.
260. See id. (“The Bar is concerned not with citizens’ ‘offense’ in the abstract, but with the
demonstrable detrimental effects that such ‘offense’ has on the profession it regulates.”)
(citation omitted).
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throwing the solicitation away, just as they could limit the offense
caused by a contraceptive ad by throwing that away.
The Court’s adoption and continued use of the “avert your eyes”
trope therefore illustrates the risks of relying on intuitive judgments
in conducting audience analysis. It might be correct that quickly
looking away from an offensive jacket in a courthouse or nudity
projected on a drive-in movie screen substantially limits the amount
of direct harm the audience might suffer from being exposed to such
speech. But it seems equally possible that this assumption is
incorrect, and if that is the case, the Court’s reliance on it would
certainly skew its ability to properly tailor the scope of First
Amendment protection.
Furthermore, the Court has appeared to pick and choose when
it will invoke this harm-limitation assumption and when it will
insist that merely looking away will not do the trick—and as we
have seen, its reasoning is not particularly persuasive as to why the
mechanism would function for some types of harms but not for
others. Thus, this apparently empirical judgment of how people
actually process speech may merely be makeweight “empirical”
support for a conclusion that is ultimately normative in nature.
That is, the Court’s judgments may more accurately reflect an
understanding that there are certain circumstances—based on, say,
the value or context of the speech in question—wherein observers
should or should not be expected to put up with offensive speech.
But the Court could simply make this point directly, without
skewing its audience analysis with a selectively applied, unsup-
ported empirical claim that averting one’s eyes substantially
mitigates the direct harm suffered by listeners.
3. Erring on the Side of Empirical Rigor
Thus, although intuitive judgments as to how audiences process
speech certainly have their place within audience analysis, courts
should generally be cautious in relying on them. Such judgments, if
incorrect, would skew courts’ ability to accurately predict the social
harm resulting from speech and thus hamper their ability to
properly calibrate the scope of First Amendment protection.
Furthermore, these judgments provide an easy opportunity for
courts to integrate, either consciously or subconsciously, external
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normative judgments into what should be a pure question of
predicted harm.
Courts should therefore exercise restraint in adopting intuition-
based judgments when conducting generalized, scrutiny-stage
audience analysis. If the goal of audience analysis is to forecast, as
accurately as possible, how an actual audience will process speech,
then courts should be solicitous of more empirical, data-driven
approaches to such analyses.261 And indeed, in recent cases, the
Supreme Court has increasingly embraced these sorts of ap-
proaches. For example, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Ass’n—in which the Court struck down California’s prohibition on
the sale or rental of violent video games to minors—both the
majority and Justice Breyer in his dissent undertook a fairly
detailed analysis of the social science data produced by the state in
support of the regulation.262 And in United States v. Alvarez—in
which the Court struck down a federal law criminalizing lying about
receiving military honors263—a plurality of the Court refused to
accept, on its face, the government’s assertion that “the public’s
general perception of military awards is diluted by false claims”
without any evidence that this was indeed the case.264
Although adopting a more evidence-based approach to audience
analysis does not render it immune from inconsistency and manipu-
lation,265 it certainly represents an approach under which courts are
better able to tailor First Amendment protection in light of the
actual harms the speech is likely to produce. The primary cost of
such an approach—at least within the context of generalized
audience analysis cases like Edenfield—would be the investment of
government and judicial resources in compiling and analyzing such
data. But if the alternative is resorting to potentially inaccurate and
highly manipulable “common sense” assumptions, then this invest-
ment seems wise whenever there is any meaningful uncertainty as
261. Again, I refer here only to the generalized Edenfield paradigm of audience analysis.
See supra Part II.B. As I discuss below, within the more contextual Fulmer paradigm of
audience analysis, the benefits of empirical evidence are not as clear-cut. See infra note 273.
262. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739, 2742 (2011); id. at 2761, 2768-
70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
263. 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012) (plurality opinion).
264. Id.
265. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1-2; infra note 280.
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to the link between the government’s regulation of speech and its
asserted regulatory interest.
Again, wasting litigant and judicial resources in cases involving
a completely obvious causal connection between speech and harm
does not make sense; intuition and common sense judgments would
suffice under such circumstances. My suggestion is merely that
courts lean heavily towards skepticism regarding any intuitive or
common sense audience assumptions, whether presented by the
government or suggested by the court itself. Take, for instance, the
Court’s recent decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.266 In
deeming the FCC’s explanation of its decision finding fleeting
expletives “indecent” adequate under the APA, Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, stated that “[t]here are some propositions for
which scant empirical evidence can be marshaled, and the harmful
effect of broadcast profanity on children is one of them.”267 Citing the
Pacifica Court’s recognition, unsupported by any empirical data, of
the state’s interest in the “well-being of its youth,” the Court noted
that “it suffices to know that children mimic the behavior they
observe—or at least the behavior that is presented to them as
normal and appropriate.”268
Writing for a four-Justice dissent, Justice Breyer, while rec-
ognizing that an agency need not “always conduct full empirical
studies of such matters,”269 pointed to the complete absence of any
empirical evidence in support of the FCC’s assertion that its
“fleeting expletives” policy “better protects children against what
[the agency] described as ‘the first blow’ of broadcast indecency.”270
Justice Breyer noted that the FCC “could have referred to, and
explained, relevant empirical studies that suggest the contrary,”
pointing to one particular study.271 He observed that “its failure to
discuss this or any other such evidence, while providing no empiri-
cal evidence at all that favors its position, must weaken the logical
force of its conclusion.”272
266. 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
267. Id. at 519.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 564 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 563.
271. Id. at 564.
272. Id.
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Although technically not a First Amendment case, Fox Televi-
sion illustrates the often unclear borderline between common sense
judgments and empirical evidence-based judgments in undertaking
audience analysis. One could plausibly say, as a matter of common
sense, that allowing fleeting expletives would encourage children to
mimic such behavior, and that such behavior would have a harmful
effect on them. But I suggest that Justice Breyer has it right, and
that courts should demonstrate an increased willingness to test
these sorts of common sense judgments with empirical analysis and
an increased expectation that the government will marshal such
evidence in support of its content-based speech regulations.273
CONCLUSION
In this preliminary exploration of the significance and mechan-
ics of First Amendment audience analysis, I have sought to
emphasize that audience analysis ought to be framed and conducted
toward the goal of forecasting, as accurately as possible, the extent
to which the speech will cause actual social harm when processed by
the targeted audience, rather than focusing on a normative inquiry
of how an idealized, hypothetical audience should process such
speech. I have therefore argued that in defining low-value speech
273. Within the Fulmer paradigm of audience analysis, a similar move towards empirical
rigor might also, in some cases, help courts delineate more accurately how audiences would
foreseeably process speech. For example, in a libel by implication case, litigants might
introduce survey data indicating how readers actually interpret the speech in question as a
basis for proving foreseeable harm. Indeed, litigants commonly use survey data to prove
“likelihood of confusion” in trademark cases, and a detailed jurisprudence regarding the
design and evidentiary significance of such data has emerged within trademark doctrine. See
6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:184 (4th
ed. 2013); id. § 32:195 (“[J]udges have come to expect that a survey will be introduced to aid
the court in determining customers’ state of mind.”); id. §§ 32:158-66 (discussing the proper
design of such surveys); id. §§ 32:184-89 (discussing how such surveys have factored into
courts’ decisionmaking processes). But given the highly fact-intensive and contextualized
nature of audience analysis in cases like Fulmer, see United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486,
1491-92 (1st Cir. 1997), it is difficult to generalize as to the usefulness of empirical approaches
in these cases. And unless empirical evidence is especially useful, the incremental accuracy
benefits provided may not justify the increase in the cost of litigation, because—unlike in the
Edenfield paradigm of audience analysis, in which the government has already “frozen” the
speech in question—high litigation costs might lead to a significant chilling effect on speakers.
See Lidsky, supra note 117, at 838 (“In First Amendment law ... the chilling effect of expensive
and protracted litigation on protected speech is likely to be substantial.”).
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categories, courts should craft audience analyses in a predictive
rather than normative posture, citing the reasonable speaker
standard as a possible model.274 I have also argued that within the
more generalized Edenfield paradigm of audience analysis, courts
should err on the side of empirical rigor in order to assess more
accurately the connection between the regulated speech and the
government’s asserted regulatory interest.275 These approaches
would sharpen courts’ ability to properly calibrate the scope of the
First Amendment in light of the actual value and harms of the
speech.
There is likely no way to know how much of a difference these
theoretical adjustments would make in the results that juries and
courts reach. Perhaps in most cases there is no significant differ-
ence between, say, a court’s judgment of how the actual targeted
audience would foreseeably act versus how a hypothetical “rational
audience” should act. Perhaps in most cases courts’ common sense
intuitions are largely correct, and an increased solicitude for
empirical rigor will not change things dramatically. It may well be
that in conducting the different forms of audience analysis, based on
a wide array of doctrinal formulations and approaches,276 courts and
juries are, in fact, doing a decent job of calculating foreseeable harm.
But this does not change the fact that as a matter of both
doctrinal purity and practical application, audience analysis should
be framed as, and calibrated around, our best and most accurate
estimation of foreseeable harms. Even in cases in which other
factors, such as the value of the speech, might ultimately trump
whatever harms it might foreseeably cause, simply knowing—or
trying to know—exactly how much speech will “cost” has inherent
value, both as a matter of judicial transparency and as a matter of
developing a First Amendment jurisprudence that is increasingly
sensitive and calibrated to the actual harms caused by speech.
Audience analysis is, by nature, highly open-ended, with courts
making speculative inquiries as to how the targeted audience will
process certain speech. In ex post speech categorization cases like
Fulmer, the court must decide which contextual factors ought to
274. See supra Part IV.A.
275. See supra Part IV.B.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 196-205 (outlining the different formulations of
audience analysis within low-value speech tests).
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matter in determining, from an ex ante posture, the foreseeable
harms caused by the speech.277 In “frozen speech” cases like
Edenfield, the court must decide exactly how much deference it will
give to the government,278 and it must determine when intuition is
sufficient to sustain a connection (or nonconnection) between speech
and harm and when empirical evidence is necessary.279 And even
when empirical evidence is marshaled, courts can make different
judgments as to the degree of empirical rigor necessary for the court
to make (or not make) a particular causal connection.280
As a result, a court undertaking audience analysis can easily
import concerns other than the actual likelihood or foreseeability of
harm—such as the value of the speech—into the calculus. Perhaps
the radically different audience analyses the Court undertook in
Bolger and Florida Bar can be best explained by a simple judgment
that the sort of commercial speech regulated in Florida Bar—direct-
mail attorney solicitations to accident victims within thirty days of
the accident281—was inherently less valuable than the commercial
speech in Bolger, which, as the Bolger Court noted, “contain[ed]
discussions of important public issues such as venereal disease and
family planning.”282 Perhaps Justice Holmes’s apparent change of
heart between Frohwerk and Abrams regarding the likelihood that
subversive advocacy would lead to concrete harm was rooted not in
a difference in empirical judgment regarding the foreseeability of
such harm, but rather in a newfound recognition of the significant
value of the speech in question.283 And perhaps the Cohen Court’s
readiness to downplay the extent to which the profanity on Cohen’s
jacket might have caused psychological harm to readers was rooted
in the fact that the speech in question carried political overtones,284
277. See supra text accompanying notes 187-88.
278. See supra Part IV.B.1.
279. See supra Part IV.B.1-2.
280. Compare, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995) (“[W]e do not read
our case law to require that empirical data come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background
information.”), with id. at 641 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Our cases require something more
than a few pages of self-serving and unsupported statements by the State to demonstrate that
a regulation directly and materially advances the elimination of a real harm when the State
seeks to suppress truthful and nondeceptive speech.”).
281. Id. at 620-21.
282. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983).
283. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
284. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
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and thus was deemed more valuable than if the jacket had said, for
example, “Fuck the Yankees.”
As many commentators have recognized, the blunt categoriza-
tion approach adopted by the Court in classifying speech by value
cannot, by nature, account for the multitude of reasons why we
might value certain speech over other speech.285 But legal doctrine
is often hydraulic in nature; whenever the rigidness in one doctrinal
area exerts pressure on courts’ decisionmaking, that pressure often
seeks release in other areas of the doctrine. As a result, the
marriage of an open-ended speech harm analysis with the more
rigid categorical speech value framework could well mean that
judgments regarding speech value leak into the far more flexible
speech harm analysis.
One can only speculate as to courts’ underlying thought
processes in conducting audience analysis, but to the extent this
sort of analytical cross-pollination occurs, courts ought to guard
against it as much as possible. The question of whether the
audience will likely process speech in a manner that produces harm
is theoretically separate from the question of how much we should
value the speech itself. For example, public political advocacy might,
under certain circumstances, foreseeably cause the same amount of
fear and intimidation in the audience as a private direct threat,
even if the value of the speech in the two situations may be so
different as to justify different results. Adopting “pure” audience
analyses—analyses focused singly on the goal of accurately
forecasting harm—promotes judicial transparency in an area in
which such transparency is especially important. In conducting
audience analyses, courts ought to ascertain and make clear how
much speech “costs” in each particular context, which would in turn
shed greater light on its assessment of the value of the speech in
question.286
Furthermore, a consistent dedication to ascertaining the
predicted costs of speech will have salutary effects on the long-term
285. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297,
298-99 (1995).
286. This is not to say that courts always ought to conduct some form of audience analysis.
If, for example, a content-based speech regulation is obviously unconstitutional because of a
clear flaw in its design, or the balance of value against harm is so one-sided as to dictate a
result, then detailed audience analysis may well be unnecessary.
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common law development of First Amendment doctrine. Although,
as noted above, audience analysis is often complicated and highly
fact-intensive, as courts collect more and more data points regarding
the harms likely to be produced by different speech under different
circumstances, they will be better able to calibrate the overall scope
of First Amendment protection. If, as I have tried to establish here,
capturing the appropriate First Amendment balance between the
value and harms of speech necessarily means understanding the
ways in which actual audiences will foreseeably process speech,
then keeping a clean record of how much harm speech will likely
cause under different circumstances is essential in pushing First
Amendment jurisprudence towards greater doctrinal purity.
